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Myron H. Ross 
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The purpose of this chapter is to comment on and give the 
general flavor of the papers presented in the seminar on the 
Economics of Aging given by the Department of Economics 
of Western Michigan University during the academic year 
1983-84.
Munnell-Schulz
Alicia Munnell provides an excellent account of the finan 
cial outlook for the social security system over the next 75 
years. In retrospect she notes that the present day financial 
problems of the system have come about because of 
forecasting errors with regard to demographics and the 
economy.
Munnell emphasizes that the key relationship is the growth 
of nominal wages relative to the growth of the price level, 
i.e., the growth of real wages. Taxes depend mainly on the 
nominal wage level and social security benefits depend main 
ly on the price level because benefits are indexed. Thus, if 
nominal wages grow faster than the price level, taxes will 
grow relative to benefits.
In addition, Munnell underscores the fact that small errors 
in forecasting can have significant effects on how one views 
the viability of the social security system. In general, she 
finds that for the next 75 years the system will run surpluses. 
Munnell summarizes matters by asserting:
During the period 1990-2020, almost no uncertain 
ties exist about the adequacy of social security
financing. Even under the pessimistic mortality and 
economic assumptions the system will run surpluses 
until 2013 and have positive fund balances until 
2020.
She notes that even if the economy performs more poorly 
than anticipated under the pessimistic assumption that real 
wages grow less than 1 percent, revenues will still be ade 
quate to cover benefits.
Could there be problems of managing this surplus? Mun- 
nell indicates that Congress has three alternatives:
(1) reduce social security tax rates.
(2) divert these surpluses to finance other programs.
(3) let tax rate increases planned in 1990 take effect.
Suppose surpluses are generated in excess of expectations 
and Congress does not reduce social security taxes or divert 
surpluses to finance other programs. It is possible that the 
surpluses generated may be so large that the trustees of the 
system (the Secretaries of Health and Human Services, 
Labor and Treasury) may be compelled to invest these funds 
in private securities, rather than public securities. Whichever 
alternative is chosen, there are potential problems.
If the trustees were to invest in privately held securities, it 
can be asked how the trustees will do this without destroying 
the traditional boundary between the private and public sec 
tors. It is not out of the question that such a policy might 
result in cabinet officers deciding which large corporations 
to take over.
To give a rough order of magnitudes involved, for 1984 
benefits from OASI, DI, and HI totaled $221.3 billion. Sup 
pose, not unrealistically, the trust fund were double benefits, 
or $442.6 billion. The trustees could then purchase about 15 
percent of the $3 trillion publicly held stock on the New York
Stock Exchange. By concentrating purchases of stock, the 
trustees could obtain a controlling interest in some corpora 
tions. If the trustees alternatively invested the surplus in the 
private bond market, the trustees may find that they have a 
controlling interest in corporations that end up in bankrupt 
cy, as the bondholders are converted to stockholders. 1
If the annual surplus of $442.6 billion were totally invested 
in U.S. Treasury securities, the trustees would be holding 
about 28 percent of the national debt. With a smaller percen 
tage of the national debt held by the public and the banking 
system, it would probably significantly diminish the power 
of the Federal Reserve to control bank reserves via open 
market operations. In any event, the prospect of larger social 
security fund surpluses will not only change the social securi 
ty system, but will also have a significant effect on the func 
tioning of the economy.
In essence Munnell holds that the "crisis" in financing the 
social security system is almost entirely due to unforeseen 
circumstances—particularly the economic malaise of the last 
decade, with its low and declining growth rates, reduced pro 
ductivity levels and high unemployment rates.
Schulz emphasizes that there is little payoff if we merely 
shift from social security to private pensions. He emphasizes 
that social security developed as a result of the failure of 
alternatives. In one sense, the development of social security 
was hardly revolutionary, since prior to World War II we 
already had an informal pay-as-you-go system whereby 
family members took care of the elderly. This informal 
private system, because of its shortcomings, gave way to the 
present social security system.
There is reason to believe that we need diversity of old age 
provisions, private as well as public. If we think of the provi 
sion for old age as an investment problem, then our aim is to
minimize risk by minimizing the variance around the mean 
retirement income, for a given return. This would call for 
diversification. That is, the variance for (say) a single public 
system of social security would be higher than a combined 
public and private system, as long as the returns from the 
two systems are independent. If the returns from private and 
public pension plans are negatively correlated, then the 
overall variance will be reduced further. Perhaps this 
negative relationship may have held during the last decade. 
With high rates of inflation the public social security benefits 
improved because of the upward bias in the consumer price 
index, while the private pension benefits worsened because 
of the lack of indexing. Thus in real terms the returns from 
private and public benefits appear to have moved in opposite 
directions.
This relationship may be changed if the U.S. Treasury 
were to issue (as the British Treasury does) a fully indexed 
bond. This would protect the individual against inflation and 
put private pensions on a par with public pensions when it 
comes to indexing.
Clark-Quinn
Clark makes the fundamental point that the elderly are no 
more vulnerable to inflation than the rest of the population. 
The converse is a common and erroneous conclusion based 
on the argument that the elderly live on fixed incomes. Clark 
puts the problem in perspective when he says,
Real income from current assets depends on the 
rate of return compared with the change in prices. 
The elderly experience inflation effects different 
from others only if the makeup of their portfolios 
differs.
Empirical support for Clark's conclusion is found in the fact 
that in 1982, coming after years of double-digit inflation, the
percentage of the elderly poor was less than the percentage of 
the general population which were poor.
These results must be handled cautiously, because Clark 
depends on the consumer price index to deflate incomes. 
Clark recognizes that the CPI has an upward bias, though 
there is considerable controversy as to the magnitude of the 
upward bias. Not only is the CPI biased upward because it is 
a Laspeyre index, but it also fails to take into account the 
fact that the elderly receive a wide range of discounts in 
many restaurants, motels, movies, pharmacies, etc. In fact, 
one of the most important discounts is given by the tax col 
lector, with the federal government providing for a double 
exemption under the personal income tax regulations. In ad 
dition, many states, such as Michigan, have a "circuit 
breaker" which limits the increase in property taxes.
If these discounts in favor of the elderly developed in a 
short period of time, they would have no effect on changes in 
the relative status of the elderly. However, if the discounts 
developed gradually—and this seems to be the case—they 
would bias the year-to-year changes in the relative status of 
the elderly.
The red thread running through Quinn's presentation is 
that incentives to retire at age 65 are quite strong. If a worker 
does not retire at age 65, "social security and employer pen 
sions impose pay cuts. . . . Many older workers respond ex 
actly how you might expect to pay cuts—they stop working 
and retire." These paycuts are not direct reductions of the 
paycheck. Rather, the paycuts involve a reduction in the 
wealth of the worker.
Quinn believes that workers' perceptions with regard to 
how the social security system operates are reasonably ac 
curate. Workers' behavior suggests that they have calculated 
the benefit-cost ratio of retiring. By taking the net present 
value of future income streams, Quinn demonstrates that it
pays to retire. The cost is the loss of social security benefits 
for one year; the benefits are the increase in future benefits 
associated with delayed retirement. Put differently, the in 
dividual has a choice between two income streams, one that 
begins immediately to pay social security benefits and 
another which is delayed for one year. Most frequently, the 
former stream is preferred to the latter stream, and workers 
behave rationally by retiring.
Quinn notes that because the actuarial adjustment in 
benefits is to increase from the current 1 percent to 7 percent, 
beginning in 1990, for each year of delayed retirement, the 
disincentives for working will be significantly diminished, 
and later retirement should occur.
Berkowitz
Berkowitz raises in bold relief the difference between 
chronological age and functional age. Since functional age is 
more difficult to determine than chronological—even 
though the former is more important than the latter—there is 
"statistical" age discrimination when firms assume a close 
correlation between functional and chronological age. Firms 
are inclined to use chronological age as a proxy for determi- 
ing functional age.
But if we discard the use of chronological age—which is 
definite and objective—what alternative criteria are there? 
Berkowitz spells out the many difficulties involved in deter 
mining functional age in workers' compensation cases and in 
the disability program under social security. He notes that 
"... nothing in the disability experience provides any aid or 
comfort to those who allege that we should eliminate com 
pulsory retirement and judge persons by their ability to do 
the job."
Berkowitz cites experience with workers' compensation in 
Florida and Michigan. The Michigan experience is par-
ticularly illuminating. In Michigan, many workers who 
retired from automobile plants simultaneously filed a claim 
for workers' compensation. Berkowitz makes it clear that no 
state program has a perfect solution to the workers' compen 
sation problem.
Other problems in determining functional age are il 
lustrated by the operation of the disability program under 
the social security system. For one thing, the law is written so 
that a worker is considered either disabled or not disabled. 
No allowance is made for partial disability. This problem is 
particularly acute in the case of disability resulting from 
mental illness. Diagnosis of mental disability is difficult and 
the worker may often appear able for an extended period of 
time and yet suffer severe mental problems at other times.
Berkowitz points out that we are uncertain whether the in 
crease in mortality increases morbidity or whether increase in 
mortality decreases morbidity. Thus at the present time we 
have no firm empirical evidence regarding the link between 
mortality and morbidity. Finally, if we were to abolish com 
pulsory retirement, we would need, according to Berkowitz, 
a better measure of functional limitation. He concludes:
. . . the argument for abolition of compulsory 
retirement centers around the notion that 
chronological age is irrelevant. The sword cuts both 
ways. Some older people are competent past the 
age of retirement and some younger people are in 
competent prior to the age of retirement. 
Eliminating compulsory retirement means that we 
have to get serious about tests of performance for 
younger workers.
A general comment should be made in conclusion. In 
much of the discussion and analysis of the social security 
system during the seminar and at other times, it is recognized 
that changes in the economy will have a significant impact on
the social security system. However, it is not always 
recognized (or at least it is poorly recognized) that changes in 
the social security system's functioning will have an impact 
on the economy. The social security system is not akin to 
Alfred Marshall's fish market, because income effects loom 
large. To get some perspective on this problem of mutual 
causation, let us examine a fairly simple illustration.
What is the impact of an increase in social security benefits 
on the surplus of the social security system? To answer this 
question it is necessary to utilize a standard macro model. 
The surplus (S) is the difference between tax revenues and 
benefits paid out. Tax revenues are endogenous, equaling the 
product of the social security tax rate and the level of real na 
tional income (tY). Benefits (B) are considered to be ex 
ogenous. Thus we have,
S = tY- B 
dS/dB = t(dY/dB)- 1
If there is significant unemployment, the benefit 
multiplier, dY/dB, might be as high as two, i.e., a one dollar 
increase in benefits will be associated with a two dollar in 
crease in national income. This also signifies that the surplus 
in the social security system will not fall by one dollar for 
every dollar increase in benefits. Rather, assuming a tax rate 
of 0.10 and using the above equation, the surplus will 
decrease by eighty cents for a dollar increase in benefits. 
Thus,
dS/dB=.10(2)- 1=-0.8
Some qualifications to this result should be noted. With 
the economy operating close to full employment, much of 
the increase in benefits will tend to crowd out other expen 
ditures, or may be spent in price level increases rather than 
increases in real income. The dY/dB would then be in the 
neighborhood of zero and dS/dB would be equal to minus
one. At the other extreme it should be noted that it is possi 
ble to postulate a reasonable model where dS/dB is positive. 
By "reasonable" it is meant that the model is stable, and in 
vestment is not only a function of the interest rate, but also 
the income level. By the same reasoning, it may be concluded 
that a one dollar increase in social security taxes will not in 
crease the surplus by one dollar, since the tax increase will 
tend to decrease real national income.
There are many other problems which focus upon the 
mutual causation of social security and the economy. For ex 
ample, to take a long run problem, does a change in social 
security taxes change the growth rate of national income, or 
does it change the level of national income. The conclusions 
will vary depending upon what growth model is considered 
relevant. These questions, however, are topics for another 
seminar.
NOTE
1. Some of these issues are raised by Stuart Street, "A Looming Federal 
Surplus," Wall Street Journal, March 28, 1984, p. 23. Peter Drucker 
also discusses similar problems with regard to private pension funds in 
The Unseen Revolution (Harper and Row, 1976).
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The Outlook for Social Security 
in the Wake of the 
1983 Amendments
Alicia H. Munnell* 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Twice during the last ten years, social security's financial 
problems have thrust the system onto the front page of 
newspapers and the cover of weekly magazines. Questions 
were raised about the program* s ability to continue to pay 
benefits and some observers predicted the system's imminent 
"bankruptcy." Yet now, only a year after the peak of the 
whoopla, the social security program is out of the headlines 
and few question its financial soundness. This seems like an 
appropriate time to explore what led to the recent financial 
crises, how the changes enacted in 1983 restored financial 
balance according to the intermediate assumptions of the 
system's Board of Trustees, and what are the major areas of 
uncertainty that necessarily attend any estimates of income 
and expenditures over a 75-year period.
/. The Social Security Program Today
The social security system consists of three programs 
financed through separate trust funds. The Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance (OASI) program, which pays benefits to 
retired workers, their dependents and survivors, is the largest 
program and will dispense $158 billion in benefits to 32 
million beneficiaries in 1984 (see Table 1). The Disability In 
surance (DI) program, which awards benefits to disabled 
workers and their dependents, will pay $17 billion to roughly 
4 million beneficiaries in 1984. The third program, Hospital
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SOURCE: Social Security Administration, 1983 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and
Disability Insurance Trust Funds (Government Printing Office, 1983), Table 20, p. 60, Table 22, p. 64, Table 28, p. 75.Table A3, p. 93, Table
A4, p. 95; 1983 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (GPO, 1982), Table 6, p. 31; and data
from Office of the Actuary and Division of Medicare Cost Analysis.
a. Beneficiaries with monthly benefits in current-payment status as of June 30th.
b. Includes both aged and disabled eligible individuals. As of July 1, 1973 hospital insurance protection was extended to disabled persons who
had been on the disability rolls for 24 months.
c. Reserves in OASI, DI and HI trust funds at end of period.
d. Estimated by Office of the Actuary, November 16, 1983, using Intermediate Assumption II-B.
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Insurance (HI), pays benefits to individuals covered by 
OASDI and the Railroad Retirement program. Benefit 
payments from this fund will amount to $46 billion in 1984. 
Most HI beneficiaries also participate in the voluntary Sup 
plementary Medical Insurance (SMI) program. The follow 
ing discussion will center primarily on the Old-Age, Sur 
vivors, and Disability portion of the program, since this was 
the area addressed by the National Commission on Social 
Security Reform and subsequently by Congress in its 
deliberations on the 1983 Amendments.
The social security system is financed on a pay-as-you-go 
basis. The 120 million active workers and their employers 
pay taxes to finance the benefits for the 36 million retired 
and disabled workers and their dependents and survivors. 
The idea is not to build up a large reserve from which 
benefits will be paid, but rather to accumulate sufficient 
funds to provide a buffer against brief, unanticipated 
economic fluctuations. At one time it was thought that a 
reserve equal to one year's benefits would be appropriate, 
but since 1970 the trust funds have held substantially less 
than that amount.
Generally, the smallness of trust fund reserves should not 
be a source of concern in a social insurance program as it 
would in a private insurance plan. Because private plans can 
not be certain of receiving future premiums, they must have 
adequate funding procedures to meet all prior and current 
commitments. In contrast, the social security system is a 
mandatory and permanent program which can rely on the 
government's taxing power to meet its obligations and can 
levy taxes on successive generations of workers to pay for 
retirement, disability, and hospital benefits. Thus, the 
system has evolved into a compact between generations, each 
generation depending on the next one to finance promised 
benefits.
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II. Reasons for the Financial Problems
Pay-as-you-go financing, however, makes the financial 
status of the social security system sensitive to economic and 
demographic developments. Short-run problems can arise if 
economic fluctuations adversely affect receipts or outlays 
and contingency reserves are not adequate to cover the 
resulting deficits. Long-run financing problems can arise if 
the size of the beneficiary population increases relative to the 
working population and the full extent of this shift has not 
been taken into account in the financing provisions.
In 1983, the social security system faced both of these dif 
ficulties. The system was confronted with an immediate 
short term cash flow problem and a conceptually distinct 
long-run imbalance between revenues and outlays. The 
short-run difficulties were almost entirely the result of the 
unanticipated poor performance of the economy during the 
1970s, while the long-run deficits were primarily attributable 
to projected cost increase associated with the rising ratio of 
beneficiaries to covered workers after the turn of the cen 
tury.
Short-Run Financial Difficulties. The year 1972 is a useful 
point from which to trace the origins of the short-run finan 
cial cirses, since legislation passed in that year introduced a 
new social security financing and benefit schedule. For the 
first time, benefits would be adjusted automatically to keep 
pace with inflation and the taxable wage base would increase 
each year to reflect the growth in average wages. In 
retrospect, the 1972 legislation contained two problems.
The first was a flaw in the indexing procedure which, 
under assumptions of high future inflation rates, caused the 
replacement rate (the ratio of benefits to preretirement earn 
ings) to increase over time. The second was a forecasting er 
ror which resulted in tax rates that were based on overly op-
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timistic economic assumptions. Essentially, the social securi 
ty Trustees assumed that the economy in the 1970s would 
operate at roughly the level experienced during the 1960s. A 
pay-as-you-go system with automatic indexing provisions is 
very sensitive to economic conditions, particularly to the 
relationship between the rate of price increase and the rate of 
wage growth. Tax revenues vary with the growth of wages, 
while benefits rise with increases in the consumer price index.
In order to understand the sensitivity of the social security 
system to forecasting errors, consider the effect on a trust 
fund (equal to one year's outgo) of first overestimating the 
growth of wages by 2 percentage points. 1 If wages grow by 2 
percentage points less than projected, payroll tax revenues 
will fall 2 percent short of the anticipated level and, where 
balance had been predicted between revenues and expen 
ditures, a 2 percent shortfall will emerge. This shortfall will 
be covered by drawing down trust fund reserves and the 
reserve ratio (the ratio of reserves on hand to annual expen 
ditures) will fall by 2 percentage points from the level 
originally projected. Even if wages grow in all subsequent 
years by the rate forecasted, the level of average wages, and 
hence tax revenues, will continue to be 2 percent lower than 
projected. The revenue-expenditure gap will never close, and 
in each subsequent year the 2 percent shortfall will require a 
transfer from the trust fund, causing the fund ratio to be 
another 2 percentage points lower than projected. In other 
words, after four years the one-shot error in forecasting 
wage growth will cause the trust fund ratio to be 8 percentage 
points lower than projected.
Should the forecasting error persist, that is, actual wage 
growth continue to fall below projected growth for several 
years, then the financial health of the program deteriorates 
far more rapidly. The social security actuaries have 
developed a simple rule of thumb that relates the difference
16
between the actual and projected reserve ratio (ARR) in a 
given year (n) to the forecasting error (ERR) in each year (t):
n
ARR= 2 (n-(t-l)) ERRt 
t=l
According to this rule, a persistent 2 percentage point 
discrepancy between actual and projected wage growth 
reduces the reserve ratio by 2 percentage points after one 
year, 6 points after two years, 12 points after three years and 
20 points after four years.
On the other hand, if the error is one of overestimating the 
inflation rate by 2 percentage points, benefits, which are in 
dexed to inflation, will be 2 percent less than projected. 
Thus, a one-shot error in forecasting inflation will allow the 
trust fund to increase each year by roughly 2 percentage 
points, while a persistent error will allow the trust fund to in 
crease by 2, 6, 12 and 20 percentage points after the first, sec 
ond, third and fourth year as discussed above.
As you can see, a 2 percent error in forecasting both wage 
growth and inflation would have largely offsetting effects 
and virtually no impact on the financial status of the pro 
gram. In contrast, overestimating wage growth and 
underestimating inflation each by 2 percent would have a 
devastating effect on trust fund reserves. Hence, the key 
relationship is not the level of wage growth and inflation, but 
the difference between the rate of growth of wages and the 
rate of increase in prices. This number is generally referred 
to as the real wage differential. 2
When the new tax and benefit schedules were established 
in 1972, it was assumed that the real wage differential would 
return to the trend rate of growth set in the 1960s (see Table 
2). That is, the social security revenue and outlay projections 
were based on a real wage differential of 2.25 percent per 
year. Under this assumption, the reserve ratio would have re-
17
mained fairly steady at 80 percent. Over the next five years, 
however, that is, from 1973 to 1977, the real wage differen 
tial actually averaged -0.3 percent rather than 2.25 percent. 
Primarily because of this difference, social security began to 
run annual deficits, which required annual transfers from 
the trust fund, so that by 1977 the reserve ratio had fallen to 
less than one-half of the projected 80 percent. 3
Table 2
Annual Percent Change in Prices and Average Covered Wages,













































SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Office of the Actuary, 1983 Annual Report of 
the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability In 
surance Trust Funds (GPO, May 1983), Table 10, pp. 37-38 and Table 14, p. 51; and Social 
Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 1982 (GPO 1982), Table 16, p. 21. 
a. The difference between the percentage increase in average annual wages and the percen 
tage increase in the annual CPI.
b. The ratio of reserves on hand at the end of one year to total expected expenditures the 
next year.
c. Excludes reserves borrowed from HI trust fund.
Legislation passed in 1977 dramatically revised the social 
security financing and benefit provisions in order to restore 
balance to the program. However, once again the tax 
schedule was set on the assumption that historical rates of
18
real wage growth would reappear, that is, that the real wage 
differential would averaged roughly 2.0 percent from 1978 
through 1982. After 1977, however, the rate of price increase 
exceeded the rate of earnings growth producing persistent 
negative real wage differentials that averaged -1.7 percent 
over the 1978-82 period. With inadequate revenues, the 
system once again began to run annual deficits that resulted 
in a rapid decline in trust fund reserves, leading to the need 
for financing changes in 1983.
Long-Run Problems. Social security's long-run financing 
problems began to appear after 1973, when the social securi 
ty actuaries started to incorporate developing demographic 
trends into the long-run projections. In the next few years, 
the projected 75-year deficit worsened steadily as the flaw in 
the indexing provision and high forecasted inflation rates 
caused continuing increases in projected replacement rates. 
The 1977 legislation stabilized replacement rates and thereby 
substantially reduced the long-run deficit (from 8.2 percent 
of taxable payrolls to 1.4 percent), but further revisions in 
demographic assumptions and lowered real wage growth 
projections after 1977 forced the 75-year deficit to increase 
gradually to a level of 1.82 percent of taxable payrolls by 
1982. Thus, both demographic and economic factors deter 
mine the long-run financial status of the social security pro 
gram.
The demographic factors are important because they 
determine the number of people who will be receiving 
benefits as compared to the number of workers who will be 
paying taxes. In the case of those people already born, the 
key demographic variable is the mortality rate. Although 
most of the startling gains in life expectancy during this cen 
tury are attributable to a substantial reduction in neonatal 
mortality and diminution of childhood diseases, the life ex 
pectancy of older persons has also increased significantly.
19
The life expectancy for men at age 65 has risen from 11.9 
years in 1940, when social security benefits were first paid, to 
14.0 in 1980 and is projected to increase to 17.5 years by 2050 
under the Trustees' intermediate mortality assumptions (see 
Table 3). The comparable figures for women are more 
dramatic, increasing from 13.4 years in 1940 to 18.3 in 1980 
and projected to rise to 23.1 in 2050 under the intermediate 
assumptions. The Trustees' pessimistic projections, which 
ironically involve less likelihood of early death, assume that 
by 2050 both men and women will live roughly 3.5 years 
longer, while the optimistic assume they will die two years 
sooner.
The size of the future workforce that will be available to 
support the retired population is determined in large part by 
the fertility rate (the expected average number of lifetime 
births for women currently entering childbearing age). Since 
1800, the fertility rate has declined persistently, although it 
deviated temporarily from this trend during the 1945-60 
post-World War II baby boom. After 1960, the fertility rate 
resumed its decline, plummeting from its prevailing level of 
3.65 to a low of 1.74 in 1976. Since 1976, the rate has fluc 
tuated between 1.76 and 1.86.
Revised fertility assumptions introduced in 1974 had a ma 
jor impact on the projected long-run costs of the system. For 
several years prior to 1974, total fertility was assumed to 
level off at an ultimate rate of 2.55 under the Trustees' in 
termediate assumptions. The 1974 Trustees' Report, 
however, incorporated the much lower fertility experience of 
the early 1970s and projected under the intermediate 
assumptions an ultimate fertility rate of 2.1, a rate that pro 
duces zero population growth. The intermediate fertility rate 
assumption was lowered again in the 1976 Trustees' Report, 
but was then raised back to the 2.1 level in 1977, where it re 
mained through 1982. The most recent social security projec-
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tions assume an ultimate fertility rate of 2.0 under the 
intermediate assumptions; under the more pessimistic 
scenario, the fertility assumption is 1.6 and for the optimistic 
2.3.
Table 3
Fertility, Life Expectancy, and Beneficiaries per Hundred Workers 
1940-1980 and Projections for 1990-2050, Selected Years
Beneficiaries 


































1990 2.01 14.5 19.2
2010 2.30 15.0 19.9
2030 2.30 15.4 20.4
2050 2.30 15.8 20.9
Intermediate (Alternative IIB)
1990 1.90 15.1 19.9
2010 2.00 16.1 21.3
2030 2.00 16.8 22.2
2050 2.00 17.5 23.1
Pessimistic (Alternative III)
1990 1.75 15.7 20.7
2010 1.60 17.6 23.0
2030 1.60 19.2 24.9













SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Office of the Actuary, 1983 Annual Report of 
the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivor's Insurance and Disability Trust 
Funds (GPO, May 1983), Table 11, p. 40 and Table 28, pp. 75 and 76. 
n.a. = not available.
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The seemingly small differences in the fertility and mor 
tality rates that are incorporated into the alternative projec 
tions produce dramatic differences in the ratio of 
beneficiaries to workers when compounded over a long 
period of time. The intermediate demographic assumptions 
imply that the number of beneficiaries per hundred workers 
will increase from 30 in 1984 to 50 by the year 2050; the 
lower fertility and longer life expectancy incorporated in the 
pessimistic assumptions produce 73 beneficiaries for each 
hundred workers, while the higher fertility and greater mor 
tality in the optimistic assumptions imply 37 beneficiaries per 
hundred workers. With a pay-as-you-go system, an increase 
in the beneficiary/worker ratio implies an proportional in 
crease in costs as a percentage of payrolls.
Long-run cost increases due to demographic shifts could 
be offset, however, by greater productivity on the part of the 
working population. The difficulty has been that the increas 
ingly adverse demographic projections have been accom 
panied by steadily worsening economic assumptions. The 
projected real wage differential has been reduced several 
times from 2.25 percent in 1973 to the present projection of 
1.5 percent, reflecting the low levels of productivity growth 
experienced during the 1970s. With only modest projected 
increases in productivity, a consensus emerged that current 
fertility and mortality trends would result in a significant in 
crease in social security costs and that additional funds 
would be required to finance the program in the twenty-first 
century.
///. The Social Security Amendments of 1983
In response to the continuing deterioration in both the 
short- and long-run financial position of the social security 
system and the inability of Congress to agree upon a solu 
tion, President Reagan in December 1981 established a 
bipartisan National Commission on Social Security Reform.
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After more than a year of debate, the Commission finally 
proposed a delicately balanced package of tax increases, 
benefit cuts, and extension of coverage, which was projected 
to produce $166 billion between 1983 and 1990. These 
changes also eliminated two-thirds of the long-run deficit 
that was projected under the intermediate assumptions to 
arise after the turn of the century as the baby boom starts to 
retire (see Table 4). In the process of adopting the Commis 
sion's recommendations, Congress also introduced an exten 
sion of the normal retirement age to close the remaining gap 
between outlays and expenditures over the next 75 years. 
Several other provisions were also adopted in an attempt to 
stabilize the financing of the system and prevent repeated 
short term crises.
Short-Run Impact: 1983-1989. The two largest producers 
of additional short-term revenues, each contributing nearly 
one-quarter of the total increase over the 1983-1989 period, 
were the proposals to delay for six months the automatic 
cost-of-living adjustment on retirement and disability 
benefits4 and the provision to accelerate the OASDI payroll 
tax rate increases that were already scheduled to take effect 
in 1985 and 1990. 5 Another major contributor to the 
system's finances, accounting for roughly 15 percent of the 
total short-run revenues produced by the legislation, was the 
proposal to tax 50 percent of social security benefits—the 
half that is generally associated with the employer's share of 
the payroll tax—for higher income recipients and to direct 
the new receipts to the OASDI trust funds. 6
The legislation produced another 10 percent of the short- 
run revenue increases by increasing the tax rate for self- 
employed people. While in the past the self-employed have 
paid taxes equal to about 75 percent of the combined 
employee and employer contributions for OASDI and 50 
percent for HI, under the new legislation they will pay 100 
percent of the combined employee-employer rate. In order to
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allow for the portion of the self-employed tax that cor 
responds to the employer's share, the self-employed will be 
allowed to deduct one-half their payroll tax liability for per 
sonal income tax purposes. 7
Table 4
Projected Cost Impact on the OASDI Program 








1. Delay COLA from July to January 39.4 0.30
2. Accelerate scheduled rate increases 39.4 0.03
3. Tax 50% of OASDI benefits for
higher-income people 26.6 0.61
4. Increase tax rate for self-employed 18.5 0.19
Coverage extension
5. Cover all nonprofit employees
and new federal workers 21.8 0.38
6. Ban withdrawal of state/local employers 3.2 0.06
Other
7. Payment from general revenues for military service
credits and uncashed checks 17.7 0.01
8. Benefit changes3 -0.4 -0.13
Total 166.2 +1.38b 
Extension of retirement age -- 0.71 
_____Total___________________________166.2_______2.09
SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Office of the Actuary, 1983 Annual Report of 
the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivor's Insurance and Disability Trust 
Funds (GPO, May 1983); and unpublished data.
a. Benefit changes include the following: Eliminating windfall benefits for persons with 
pensions from noncovered employment; continuing benefits for remarried disabled 
widow(er)s and for divorced widow(er)s; indexing deferred widow(er)'s benefits based on 
the lesser of wages and prices; permitting divorced aged spouse to receive benefits when 
husband is eligible; and increasing benefit rate for disabled widow(er)s aged 50-59 to 71.5 
percent of primary benefit. Also included in this figure, however, is $1 billion increase in 
revenue that results from accelerating state and local tax collections, 
b. Total effect of reforms on trust funds as percent of payroll is not the sum of individual 
percentages. Rather the total reflects the interaction of individual reforms upon one 
another, including the following additional reforms: taxation of certain salary plans, alter 
ing of the earnings test and adjustment of self-employment income.
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Roughly 15 percent of the total increase in short term 
revenues was gained from extending coverage to new federal 
employees and the uncovered workers in the nonprofit sec 
tor8 and from banning future withdrawals of state and local 
employers. 9 The remaining 10 percent of short term revenues 
came from the proposal to make a payment from general 
revenues to the OASDI trust funds to compensate the system 
for gratuitous military service wage credits granted before 
1983 and to provide reimbursement for social security checks 
issues but never redeemed. 10
The Long Run and Extension of the Retirement Age. In 
addition to raising a projected $166 billion over the period 
1983-1989, the National Commission's proposals enacted in 
the 1983 Amendments eliminated two-thirds of the 75-year 
deficit. 11 Although the Commission members who had voted 
in favor of the consensus package had agreed that the long 
range deficit should be reduced to approximately zero, they 
were unable to agree on a specific proposal to accomplish 
this. Members selected by the Democratic leadership sup 
ported an increase in contribution rates in 2010 (about 0.5 
percent of earnings for the employee and a like amount for 
the employer), while the remaining designees favored a 
gradual increase in the retirement age.
Congress opted for extending the retirement age as a 
means of eliminating the long-run deficit. As a result of the 
1983 Amendments, the retirement age will rise to 66 by 2009, 
then to 67 by 2027. 12 People can still elect early retirement at 
62, but benefits paid to early retirees will be reduced by 25 
percent in 2009 and by 30 percent in 2027. Early retirees are 
currently penalized 20 percent. Raising the retirement age 
reduces long-run costs by 0.71 percent of taxable payrolls, 
thereby creating a small surplus in the OASDI program over 
the 75-year projection period under the intermediate 
assumptions.
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Revenue Stabilizers. The 1983 Amendments also contain 
ed three provisions designed to improve the system*s ability 
to continue paying benefits on a timely basis even during 
adverse economic conditions. These include a speed-up in 
monthly transfers from the Treasury, an extension of inter- 
fund borrowing, and a revised indexing procedure.
Normalizing Transfers: To protect against potential cash 
flow problems created by the uneven way in which benefits 
are paid and taxes are transferred to social security, Con 
gress introduced a revised procedure for crediting taxes to 
the trust funds. Under the previous procedures benefits were 
paid on the third of the month, creating the need for high 
balances in the OASDI trust fund during the first week. 
Taxes, however, were transferred to the trust funds daily, 
based on Treasury estimates of amounts collected. Under the 
revised procedure, the Treasury is authorized to estimate 
amounts to be collected in a given month and transfer such 
sums to the trust funds on the first or second day of the 
month. This technical procedure will help ensure that the 
cash is available at the time benefit payments are made.
Extending Interfund Borrowing: Amendments to the Om 
nibus Reconciliation Act, passed on December 29, 1981, 
authorized borrowing through December 1982 among the 
OASI, DI, and HI trust funds to finance deficits up to June 
1983. The OASI fund borrowed $17.5 billion from the other 
funds ($5.1 billion from DI and $12.4 billion from HI) in 
November and December 1982 in order to ensure benefit 
payments through June 1983. The 1983 Social Security 
Amendments extended the authority for interfund borrow 
ing for calendar years 1983-1987 with the provision that all 
principal and interest be paid by the end of 1989. 13
Revising the COLA: As noted above, the short term fi 
nancing problem in social security was entirely the result of 
the unanticipated poor performance of the economy during
26
the past few years. Tax rates were set on the assumption that 
taxable wages would grow at the rate of increase in prices 
plus an additional amount for productivity growth. After 
1977, however, the traditional relationship between price 
and wages was reversed and price increases exceeded wage 
growth. With prices rising faster than wages, benefits, which 
are linked to the consumer price index, increased faster than 
payroll tax revenues, which are dependent on the growth in 
wages. As a result, trust fund balances were rapidly depleted.
In an attempt to avoid this problem in the future, Con 
gress established that if OASDI reserves ever drop below 15 
percent (20 percent beginning in 1989) of the following year's 
planned outlays, the automatic cost-of-living adjustment 
would be based on the lower of the CPI increase or the in 
crease in average wages until the trigger ratio is restored. 
Subsequently, when the reserves reach 32 percent of outlays, 
benefits would be adjusted to make up for any payments that 
were less than those called for by the price adjustment. The 
payback would occur only so long as reserves met the 32 per 
cent standard. This change will help avoid a repetition of the 
recent short-run financial crisis.
IV. Some Uncertainties
With any luck in terms of the performance of the economy 
and demographic developments, the financial package 
enacted in the 1983 Amendments should ensure the solvency 
of the retirement and disability programs for the next 75 
years. The need for luck, however, highlights the fact that 
some uncertainties surround both the short-run and long-run 
outlook for the social security system. These uncertainties 
have little to do with the intrinsic health of the program, but 
rather with the fact that tax rates are set on the basis of 
assumed economic and demographic developments and the 
revenues produced by these tax rates will provide inadequate 
or excessive if the actual performance of the economy differs
27
from that projected. In order to assess the reliability of the 
projections, it is useful to identify some of the major uncer 
tainties and estimate the magnitude of their potential impact 
on the financial status of the program. This exercise should 
provide some comfort to those who continue to worry about 
the solvency of the social security program, since the analysis 
reveals that potential deviations from the assumed perfor 
mance would require relatively minor increases in OASDI 
tax rates.
1984-1989: Economic Performance. For the period from 
now through 1989, the 1983 social security package was con 
structed so that the system would be adequately financed not 
only under the Trustees' intermediate economic assump 
tions, but also under the more pessimistic scenario. Most of 
the additional revenues under the pessimistic assumptions 
are attributable to the revised indexing procedure, whereby 
benefits are adjusted by the lesser of increases in prices or 
wages when trust fund reserves are low. The problem is that 
during the 1970s the economy performed even more poorly 
than the social security Trustees' pessimistic assumptions 
and, therefore, a legitimate question can be raised about 
whether the revenue and outlay projections for the rest of the 
1980s are realistic.
In fact, no mechanism exists to answer that question; in- 
sead, the only basis for assessment is to compare the social 
security assumptions with those of independent forecasters. 
As of April 1983, the month the 1983 Amendments were 
signed into law, the projections of the private forecasters 
clustered around the social security Trustees' intermediate 
and pessimistic assumptions and updated forecasts from 
Data Resources, Inc. and Chase Econometrics show the 
private projections bracketing these assumptions. Thus, the 
social security forecasts appear to be based on reasonable 
assumptions about future economic trends (see Table 5).
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Table 5
Comparison of Projections, as of Fourth Quarter 1983,
of the Real Wage Differential3 by Social Security
and Private Forecasters, 1984-1989



































SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Office of the Actuary, "Possible 'Automatic 
Operations' in 1984-85," memorandum (November 16, 1983), Table 1 and unpublished 
data; and Data Resources, Inc. and Chase Econometrics/Interactive Data Corp., projec 
tions based on data available before December 30, 1983.
a. The difference between the percentage increase in average annual wages in covered 
employment and the percentage increase in the annual CPI for all wage and salaried 
workers.
b. Since the private forecasters do not project wages in covered employment, wage growth 
is calculated on the basis of wages and salaries per worker in the private sector. For Chase 
and DRI standard long-term forecasts were used, moderate growth and tend, respectively.
Moreover, the really difficult period for social security 
financing is only the four years 1984 through 1987, since 
revenues will jump markedly in 1988, when a scheduled 
OASDI tax rate increase of 0.36 percent each for the 
employee and employer takes effect. (Another 0.14 percent 
increase becomes effective in 1990.) Little likelihood of an 
economic downturn exists for 1984 and while a serious reces 
sion in 1985 could cause some problems, such a development 
is very unlikely. By 1986, even with a repetition of the 
disasterous conditions of 1979 and 1980, the OASI and DI 
trust funds should have adequate reserves to continue 
payments through 1988 when the new revenues will be 
available. In addition to their own reserves, the OASI and DI
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funds can borrow from the HI trust fund until 1988. The 
combination of borrowing capability, substantial reserves, 
and a reasonably health economic outlook makes the 
possibility of another short term social security financing 
crisis very unlikely. 14
1990-2020 Accumulation of Trust Fund Reserves. In 
marked contrast to the 1980s, the outlook for OASDI finan 
cing for the period 1990-2020 has always been favorable. The 
primary reason is demographic. The low fertility rates during 
the late 1920s and the 1930s will be reflected in a con 
siderable reduction in the rate of increase in the population 
over age 65 during the 1990s and the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. While the average annual increase in 
the number of persons over 65 will be about 600,000 during 
the 1980s, the net increase will drop to around 400,000 a year 
under the intermediate assumptions between 1990 and 2010 
in spite of the improvement in the mortality rate. At the 
same time, the baby boom generation born after World War 
II will continue to swell the labor force. As a result, the ratio 
of beneficiaries to workers, which has increased continually 
since 1940, is estimated to remain stable for the next 20 to 30 
years at its current level of roughly 30 beneficiaries per hun 
dred workers. With a stable ratio of beneficiaries to workers, 
even modest productivity gains will reduce the cost of social 
security as a percent of payroll.
At the same time costs are projected to decline, revenues 
are scheduled to increase since a combined employee- 
employer payroll tax increase of 1.0 percent is slated to take 
effect by 1990. With lower costs and higher revenues, the 
retirement and disability program is projected to run 
substantial annual surpluses and the ratio of assets to outlays 
is estimated to increase from 38 percent in 1990 to 538 per 
cent by 2020 under the intermediate assumptions. These ac 
cumulated reserves are then scheduled to be drawn down to 
cover annual deficits in the years between 2020 and 2057.
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During the period 1990-2020, almost no uncertainties exist 
about the adequacy of social security financing. Even under 
the pessimistic mortality and economic assumptions the 
system will run surpluses until 2013 and have positive trust 
fund balances until 2020. Should the economy perform more 
poorly than the pessimistic assumptions, particularly should 
the real wage differential fall below 1 percent, revenues will 
still be adequate to cover benefit commitments, although not 
sufficient to produce substantial surpluses.
The uncertainty surrounding social security financing dur 
ing the period 1990-2020 arises then not from possible 
adverse economic or demographic developments, but rather 
from the possibility of congressional action. The major ques 
tion is whether Congress will allow a substantial accumula 
tion of assets in the OASDI trust funds or whether it will 
divert scheduled payroll taxes to finance other programs or 
simply not allow the 1990 rate increase to take effect. If 
reserves are not accumulated during the period, then tax 
rates will have to be raised after 2020 in order to finance the 
annual deficits on a current cost basis. It is important to 
note, however, that the rate hike that would be required if 
reserves are not accumulated is fairly modest—roughly 1 
percent each for the employee and employer under the in 
termediate assumptions (see Table 6).
The Role of the Hospital Insurance Program. A major 
obstacle to the buildup of assets in the OASDI trust fund 
may be the financial requirements of the Hospital Insurance 
program. Although the HI trust fund was a source of 
strength during the recent financial crisis, it faces serious 
financing problems in the near future. Unless further policy 
changes are implemented, the Congressional Budget Office 
projects the depletion of the HI fund by the end of the 
decade. The deficits would be small initially, but they would 
increase each year so that by 1995 the annual deficit would
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be $60 billion and the cumulative deficits would total over 
$200 billion.
Table 6
Estimated Average Cost Rate, Average Total Income Rate 
and Actuarial Balance for OASDI, and HI Trust Funds, 
Under Three Assumptions, Selected Periods, 1983-2057
Period










































































SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Office of the Actuary, 1983 Annual Report of 
the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability In 
surance Trust Funds (GPO, May 1983), Table 31, pp. 79-80; and 1983 Annual Report of 
the Board of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, Table 11, p. 47.
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Projected deficits could be substantially lower if cost- 
containment efforts are successful. For example, the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services has the power to set 
hospital reimbursement rates after 1985. If the Secretary 
decided to limit the increase in payments per admission to 
only 1 percentage point mre than the rate of increase of 
hospital input prices, the depletion date for the HI trust fund 
would be postponed until 1992 and the cumulative deficit 
would amount to roughly $85 billion by 1995.
Even with successful cost-containment efforts, therefore, 
some residual deficits appear almost inescapable. Hence, it is 
quite possible that Congress may decide to cover some of HI 
deficit by reallocating to the Hospital Insurance trust fund a 
portion of the payroll tax revenues now scheduled to go into 
the retirement and disability programs after 1990.
2020-2057: Demographic and Economic Assumptions. 
The financial solvency of the social security program after 
the year 2020 hinges crucially on demographic developments 
being in line with the social security Trustees' intermediate 
projections and to a somewhat lesser extent on productivity 
growth producing an adequate real wage differential.
Demographic Projections: The intermediate assumption 
of the social security Trustees, that the fertility rate will in 
crease from its current level of 1.8 to an ultimate value of 2.0 
by 2005, is slightly higher than the most recent projections by 
the Census Bureau. Until October 1982, the Census Bureau's 
"middle" series had assumed a long-run fertility rate of 2.1, 
the rate that produces zero population growth over the long- 
run. Now the Census assumes that fertility rates will remain 
fairly steady, increasing slightly from 1.80 to 1.96 in 2000 
and then decreasing gradually to 1.9 births per woman in 
2050. Supporting the somewhat higher social security projec 
tions, however, is the fact that data on expected births in 
dicate that young women continue to expect to have more
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than two children over their lifetimes. Thus, the social 
security intermediate projection of a long-run fertility rate of 
2.0 appears more likely than either the optimistic or 
pessimistic projections of 2.3 or 1.6, respectively. That is, it 
would be very difficult to make a convincing case for a fer 
tility rate assumption substantially different from that incor 
porated in the Trustees' intermediate projections. 15
Economic Assumptions: While the central projections 
seem to be based on realistic demographic assumptions, they 
may incorporate a somewhat optimistic assumption about 
the rate of productivity growth. The intermediate projec 
tions of the retirement and disability funds are based on an 
assumed long-run real wage differential of 1.5 percent. 
Although this number is considerably below the 3.0 percent 
differential experienced in the 1950s and the 2.1 percent dur 
ing the 1960s, it exceeds the average of 1.2 percent over the 
last 30 years. In addition, the real wage differential of 1.5 
percent implies long-run productivity gains of 2.1 percent, 
which is somewhat higher than most estimates. 16
The interesting fact, however, is that the long-run costs of 
the program are not all that sensitive to the real wage dif 
ferential. For example, if the long-run real wage differential 
were 1 percent instead of 1.5 percent, the cost of the system 
in the 2020-2057 period would be roughly 1.0 percent of tax 
able payrolls higher and the cost of the program over the en 
tire 75-year forecasting horizon would be 0.8 percent higher. 
This would mean that instead of being in long-run balance, 
the system would have a 75-year deficit of 0.8 percent of tax 
able payrolls. To put this deficit in perspective, it must be 
compared with the total cost of the program, which would be 
roughly 13.7 percent of taxable payrolls. Of this total cost, 
12.9 percent would be covered by scheduled payroll taxes, 
while 0.8 percent would be unfunded. In other words, the 
deficit produced by a real wage differential of 1 percent 
rather than 1.5 percent would amount to only 6 percent of
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program expenditures over the 75 years. Under the tradi 
tional rule of thumb adopted by the social security Trustees, 
the system is considered to be in close actuarial balance if 
revenues are equal to plus or minus 5 percent of planned 
outlays. Thus, even a substantial deviation from the assumed 
real wage growth will require only a relatively modest in 
crease in the payroll tax rate to restore financial balance to 
the retirement and disability programs.
After 2057. To even discuss the outlook for social security 
after the year 2057 verges on the ridiculous. It is comparable 
to having concluded in 1909 that a program was adequately 
financed through 1984 and then worrying about what was 
going to happen in 1985. Nevertheless, for the sake of com 
pleteness, it is probably useful to mention two factors that 
pertain to the end of the forecast period. The first is that the 
reserves that are scheduled to accumulate during the period 
1990-2020 will be exhausted by 2057. Hence, the OASDI 
payroll tax rate will have to be raised under the intermediate 
assumptions by roughly 1 percentage point each for 
employees and employers in the middle of the next century to 
cover the costs of the program.
The second factor is that because of the mechanics of 
calculating the long-run financial status of the program, 
future estimates will begin to show small deficits even if the 
intermediate assumptions turn out to be completely ac 
curate. This will occur because the 75-year projection is a 
rolling average of individual years, and as time progresses 
the near-term years of projected surpluses will be replaced by 
the years of deficit after 2057, the end of the current projec 
tion horizon. The magnitude of this phenomenon is very 




Congress passed major legislation in 1983 which raised 
taxes, reduced benefits, and broadened coverage in order to 
provide financial balance to the social security program over 
the next 75 years. The preceeding analysis indicates that the 
1983 Amendments have done the job. In the critical period 
between now and the 1988 rate hike, the system appears ade 
quately financed even under the pessimistic set of economic 
assumptions. Moreover, the economic forecasts used by 
social security are consistent with those prepared by private 
firms.
Between 1988 and 2020, there is little question that 
revenues will be sufficient to cover promised benefits. In 
deed, the major question is how large the trust funds will 
become as the system experiences successive annual 
surpluses. This depends somewhat on economic and 
demographic developments, but the determining factor will 
be Congress' willingness to deviate from pay-as-you-go 
financing and allow an accumulation of reserves. If funds 
are needed to finance the Hospital Insurance program, a 
decision might be made to divert some of the scheduled 
payroll taxes to finance HI. Even in th event of such a diver 
sion, however, the system appears to have plenty of money 
for the next 40 years.
After 2020, the program starts to run annual deficits and a 
possibility exists that some additional financing might be re 
quired if either adequate reserves are not allowed to ac 
cumulate during the 1990-2020 period or the real wage dif 
ferential turns out to be lower than projected. Even if either 
of these events should occur, however, the size of the tax in 
crease that would be required to compensate appears 
relatively modest—perhaps 1 percent each for the employee 
and employer. Hence, the financing of the retirement and 




1. This discussion of the effect of forecasting errors is based on a presen 
tation by Lawrence H. Thompson, "Social Security Financing: Recent 
Problems and Current Uncertainties," prepared for annual meeting of 
Industrial Relations Research Association, San Francisco, December 30, 
1983 and on Dwight K. Bartlett and Joseph A. Applebaum, "Economic 
Forecasting: Effect of Errors on OASDI Fund Ratios," Social Security 
Bulletin 45 (1) (January 1982), pp. 9-14.
2. Because of the time lag in adjusting benefits, the level of inflation does 
have a small impact on the cost of the system even with a constant real 
wage differential. For example, the 75-year deficit would range from 
-0.33 percent of taxable payrolls to -(-0.36 percent as the underlying in 
flation rate ranged from 2 percent to 6 percent even with a constant real 
wage differential of 1.5 percent.
3. Other factors contributing to social security's financial problems were 
a higher-than-expected unemployment rate which further reduced 
revenues and an unprecedented increase in disability claims.
4. Since 1975 cost-of-living adjustments were made annually in June 
(payable in July) to reflect changes in the consumer price index (CPI), 
measured by the first quarter of the current year over the first quarter of 
the previous year. The legislation shifted the 1983 COLA from June to 
December and provided that all subsequent increases be awarded in 
December (payable in January), based on the elevel of the CPI in the 
third quarter of that year over the level in the third quarter of the 
previous year.
5. The 1983 legislation moved the scheduled 1985 OASDI rate increase to 
1984 and part of the scheduled 1990 increase to 1988. As a result, the 
1984 OASDI tax is 5.7 percent each for employers and employees and is 
slated to rise to 6.06 percent in 1988 and 6.2 percent in 1990. With a HI 
tax of 1.45 percent beginning in 1986, the total social security payroll tax 
will rise from its present level of 7.0 percent to 7.51 percent in 1988 and 
7.65 percent in 1990. In order to postpone the impact of the 1984 increase 
until 1985, however, the legislation provided employees a credit of 0.3 
percent of taxable wages so that net OASDI tax remains unchanged at 
5.4 percent for 1984.
6. One-half of social security benefits are subject to taxation if 50 per 
cent of the benefits, combined with other income plus certain nontaxable
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income, exceed $32,000 in the case of a married couple and $25,000 for 
single individuals.
7. The deduction becomes effective in 1990. In the interim, the tax in 
crease will be accompanied by a tax credit of 2.7 percent of taxable earn 
ings in 1984, 2.3 percent in 1985 and 2 percent in 1986 through 1989.
8. Before the 1983 Amendments, the social security system covered 90 
percent of jobs in paid employment. The 10 percent of workers who were 
not covered by social security included most federal civilian workers (2.4 
out of 2.7 million), about 30 percent of state and local employees (ap 
proximately 3 million), and 15 to 20 percent of employees of nonprofit 
organizations (up to 1 million). The 1983 Amendments extended 
coverage to all newly hired federal civilian employees and to uncovered 
workers in nonprofit institutions. For these groups, this provision not 
only eliminates the windfall component of benefits that arises when 
formerly uncovered workers have minimum coverage and profit from 
social security's progressive benefit formula, but also improves the pro 
tection for many workers, particularly in the area of disability and sur 
vivors insurance. The windfall component for those groups who con 
tinue to remain uncovered is partially eliminated in the legislation by 
modifying the benefit formula for persons with pensions from non- 
covered employment.
9. Since 1950 social security coverage for employees of the states and 
localities has been available on a voluntary basis through agreements be 
tween the political entity and the Secretary of Health and Human Ser 
vices. States could voluntarily terminate coverage with two years' ad 
vanced notice. Until the mid-1970s the number of employees leaving the 
system was always exceeded by the number of newly covered 
employees—in most years by 50,000 or more. After 1975, however, the 
number of workers for whom coverage was terminated exceeded the 
number of newly covered employees. These terminations not only reduc 
ed the payroll tax base, but also caused some employees to lose protec 
tion and created resentment on the part of other workers who were 
covered on a mandatory basis. To alleviate these problems, the 1983 
Amendments prohibited state and local governments from terminating 
coverage after April 14, 1983.
10. The military have been covered under social security since 1957, but 
military personnel pay contributions only on the cash paid to them. The 
government pays the costs of the benefit credits made on the basis of 
nonpecuniary allowances for room and board. However, the government
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did not make current payments for these credits, but rather transferred 
the money to the social security trust funds only when the benefits were 
paid. Moreover, prior to 1957, free credits of $160 per month were 
granted for service in the armed forces. These credits, too, were paid on 
ly after the benefits were awarded, and the cost was amortized over a 
long period of time. The 1983 Amendments provided for the OASDI 
trust funds to receive a lump-sum payment from the Treasury to make up 
for the back amounts owed by the government. In the future the OASDI 
trust funds will be reimbursed on a current basis for the employee and 
employer taxes on the benefit credits made in lieu of allowances for room 
and board.
11. The relative importance of the specific proposals on long-run costs 
and revenues, however, differed somewhat from their impact on the 
system in the short run. The change that had the greatest long range ef 
fect was the proposal to tax one-half of social security benefits. While the 
income limits initially restrict the taxation to less than 10 percent of the 
population, eventually about half of all beneficiaries will be affected. 
The proposal to bring employees of nonprofit institutions and newly 
hired federal workers under social security also has a favorable long 
range impact. The saving arises because an estimated 73 percent of those 
involved would have qualified for sizable social security benefits as a 
result of other employment even without the extension of coverage. 
Also, federal employees tend to have wages that are higher than average 
and, therefore, are entitled to less heavily weighted benefits.
12. Specifically, the age for full benefits will be increased to 66 by two 
months a year for six years so that provision would be fully effective 
beginning with those attaining age 62 in 2005 (66 in 2009); maintained at 
age 66 for people reaching are 62 in 2006-2016; increased by two months 
a year for people reaching age 62 in 2017-2022; and maintained at age 67 
for people reaching 62 after 2022.
13. The 1983 legislation puts restrictions on interfund borrowing, par 
ticularly: 1) interest must be paid monthly on any outstanding loans; 
2) no fund can borrow from the other in any month in which the other's 
trust fund ratio is under 10 percent; 3) in 1983-1987, each fund must 
repay loans whenever its fund ratio at yearend exceeds 15 percent; and 
4) in 1988-1989, the loan balance outstanding at the end of 1987 must be 
repaid in 24 equal monthly payments.
14. Some speculation has emerged that trust fund reserves may fall 
slightly below 15 percent in 1984 or 1985, triggering the revised indexing
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procedure. Even if this should occur, it would probably have no effect on 
benefits, since wages will almost certainly rise faster than prices. Hence, 
no changes in benefits or taxes are likely in the short run.
15. On the other hand, the enormous fluctuation experienced in fertility 
trends would argue against being too complacent about any projection of 
future fertility rates. The hazards of forecasting population growth can 
be easily demonstrated by historical experience. In 1943 it was 
authoritatively estimated that the 1980 United States population would 
be perhaps as low as 146 million, or perhaps be as high as 179 million; in 
1958 the corresponding low and high forecasts of the 1975 population 
were 231 million and 273 million; the event—a population of 228 
million—confounded both these projections. See Warren S. Thompson 
and P.K. Whelpten, "Estimates of the Future Population of the United 
States, 1940 to 2000," paper presented for the National Resources Plan 
ning Board (1943) and U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population 
Reports, "Illustrative Projections of the Population of the United 
States, by Age and Sex, 1960 to 1980," series P-25, No. 187 (GPO, 
1958).
16. An ultimate rate of productivity gains of 2.1 percent per year was 
derived from the projected real-wage differential of 1.5 percent per year 
by increasing it by 0.3 percent for the relative annual growth of fringe 
benefits; 0.2 percent for the average number of hours worked per week; 
and 0.1 percent for the average number of weeks worked per year.
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The Economics of Aging*
Doomsday or Shangrila?
James H. Schulz 
Brandeis University
The well-known social commentator Gunnar Myrdal 
(1963), writing in the early Sixties, had this to say about the 
elderly in America:
The treatment of old people in America, many of 
whom have a hard life behind them, is 
remarkable. . . [This is illustrated by] the terrifying 
extent to which old people are left in poverty and 
destitution. ... It cannot possibly be the con 
sidered opinion of the majority of Americans that 
so many of those who in America are often called 
"senior citizens" should be left in misery, squalor, 
and often forbidding loneliness, unattended though 
they are in need of care. The situation is overripe 
for a radical reform of the old age security system.
Contrast Myrdal's comment with a recent story that ap 
peared in the Washington Post:
A new Census Bureau study shows that the elderly 
in this country are much better off than previously 
believed and, in fact, are better off than the average 
American. . . .
The article by Spencer Rich (1983) in the Washington Post 
goes on to describe how the per capita, after-tax income of
*This presentation was based on an article by James Schulz published in Charles M. Gaitz, 
et al., Aging 2000: Our Health Care Destiny, Vol. II (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1985), 
and is reprinted with permission.
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the elderly was $6,300 in 1980 versus $5,964 for the popula 
tion as a whole.
Looking at these new Census Bureau findings and a 
number of other recent studies, one can begin to see the 
outlines of a very fundamental change with regard to the 
economic status of the elderly. From a statistical point of 
view, the elderly in this country are beginning to look a lot 
like the rest of the population: some very rich, lots with ade 
quate income, lots more with very modest incomes (often 
near poverty), and a significant minority still destitute. This 
is very different from the past when most were destitute.
The past three decades have been marked by steady im 
provements in the economic situation of the elderly. Pension 
coverage has spread rapidly, real benefit levels have increas 
ed, and health protection is generally financially obtainable. 
Moreover, the general economic prosperity of the post- 
World War II period (that is, up until recently) has served to 
facilitate among those middle-aged and older the accumula 
tion of an impressive stock of economic wealth in the form 
of housing, durables, and pension accurals.
But just when we thought the problem of providing ade 
quate income in retirement for most elderly was solved, a 
whole new set of uncertainties arose:
1. Life-Threatening Economic Instability. I say "life- 
threatening" as a way of dramatizing the differences in the 
character of the macro problems that suddenly appeared in 
the Seventies. Inflation and unemployment unexpectedly 
became both more severe and of longer duration—to the ex 
tent that the resulting economic deprivation, mental stress, 
inadequate medical care, and malnutrition threatened life 
itself for a much broader spectrum of the American popula 
tion.
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As families attempted to cope with the harsh realities of 
this economic instability, few realized (or had the time or in 
clination to think about) the simultaneous erosion of the 
base for their retirement security that was also occurring. 
Wealth in housing and consumer durables deteriorated. And 
a private pension system, designed to reward long-term 
workers at the expense of those who lose or change jobs, 
proceeded to wipe out billions of dollars in potential pension 
accruals as millions of workers changed jobs without vested 
pension rights. And probably what is more serious is the 
gradual, invisible erosion of pension benefit rights that will 
take place over the coming years. The forced mobility of the 
Seventies and Eighties also produced a gigantic pool of pen 
sion benefit accruals for those job changers fortunate 
enough to be eligible for vesting. But since these accruals are 
not indexed, they are highly vulnerable to monetary 
depreciation from the inflation that can be expected in the 
years ahead. Few people today (even policymakers) are sen 
sitive to this problem. Few see that this is the great retirement 
"legacy" of the Carter-Reagan years: lost pension benefits. 
Instead, most attention has been focused on social security, 
the next uncertainty to be discussed.
2. Chaotic Social Security Financing. It is almost amusing 
to look back over the social security events of the recent past: 
a nation bumbling along from one social security financial 
crisis to another, like a little mom and pop grocery store 
always on the brink of bankruptcy. What we have witnessed 
is one of the great social programs of the richest country in 
the world seemingly almost brought to its knees by the 
economic instability discussed above. The result: cries of 
anguish, much handwringing, and finally a financial "fix" 
until the next crisis arises.
To me, a pension expert who has given years of attention 
to pension financing issues, events seem more the result of
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political maneuvering than the product of fundamental 
economic problems. But to others, the problems (both 
economic and political) seem very real. And for the first time 
since it was established, support for social security seems in 
doubt as confidence deteriorates among policymakers and 
program participants. What was once unthinkable—major 
cutbacks—have become a reality: benefit cuts, benefit taxa 
tion, and a scheduled rise in the retirement age.
For purposes of this paper, then, it only remains to ask the 
question: if social security is in a state of change, what can be 
counted on? Obviously this new uncertainty makes it dif 
ficult to plan for the future.
3. The Early Retirement Bomb. For many years now 
analysts have pointed with great anxiety to the dramatic 
declines in labor force participation among the older popula 
tion. For reasons we summarize below, many have referred 
to this social phenomenon as a ticking bomb that might ex 
plode in the nation's face at some future time.
It is important to distinguish the growing interest and 
ability to retire in general from the phenomenon of exercis 
ing the retirement option at increasingly early ages. The 
"right to retire" is not what is at issue. Rather the issue is the 
age of election and who will pay the costs. For example, ac 
tuaries point out that pension costs increase by about 50 per 
cent once the normal age of retirement is reduced from age 
65 to age 60.
Yet, throughout the country, powerful forces are at work 
to remove people from the labor force before age 65. In 
creasing numbers of workers are retiring under the social 
security early retirement option. Federal employees can 
retire on full benefits at age 55 with 30 years of service; in 
fact, the President's Commission on Pension Policy reported 
that 59 percent of retiring male civil service servants (fiscal
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1978) were age 60 or younger. Most state and local govern 
ment employee plans also have very liberal retirement provi 
sions. Early retirement is usually possible after 20 to 30 years 
of service—often as early as age 50 or 55.
Less well known are the retirement options provided under 
private pension plans. The generous provisions of the big 
plans—for example, in the auto industry—are well known. 
Few data are published, however, on the hundreds of 
thousands of plans in other industries. One recent study of 
pension plans by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1980), 
has found that more than half of covered workers were eligi 
ble to receive normal retirement benefits before age 65. And 
almost a third were eligible for normal benefits at age 60 or 
earlier!
Another study of defined benefit plans covering about 23 
million workers in 1974 (Schulz, et al., 1980) shows that 70 
percent of these workers were eligible for early retirement 
benefits at age 60 (provided service requirements, if any, 
were met). Over half could retire as early as age 55, and 15 
percent were in plans with even earlier eligibility ages (or no 
age requirement at all).
But these numbers do not tell the whole story. More than 
90 percent of all workers covered by private pensions are in 
plans having "early retirement" options. When a worker 
retires early, that is before the " normal" retirement age, the 
benefit is usually reduced. A large number of employers, 
however, encourage their employees to retire early by absorb 
ing some of the costs of paying pensions over a longer period 
of time. Thus, while some plans reduce benefits by the full 
actuarial discount, many plans, in effect, give actuarial 
bonuses to workers who retire early.
The study of defined benefit plans in 1974 indicated that 
powerful economic incentives are provided in many plans.
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For example, there were about seven million workers in 1974 
covered by plans permitting their retirement at age 60 with 
less than a full actuarial reduction in benefits.
Thus, we see that social security is not the sole force 
pushing workers into retirement. Certainly social security in 
come, when it becomes available, encourages workers to 
retire. But for many workers it is military, federal, 
state/local, or private plans that make it possible to retire at 
increasingly early ages.
Pensions have become an important tool of personnel 
management, especially in dealing with excess labor situa 
tions. As Juanita Kreps (1977) pointed out a few years ago, 
"retirement, a relatively new lifestage, has quickly become 
a ... device for balancing the number of job seekers with 
the demand for workers at going rates of pay." But make no 
mistake, early retirement is also very popular with unions 
and the workers themselves.
This trend of early retirement raises new uncertainties. To 
the extent that early retirement benefits are reduced benefits, 
will the resulting retirement income be adequate? Will the 
lower benefits ultimately trigger demands for higher ones? 
Will meeting the costs of paying pension benefits over in 
creasing periods of time create financing problems for public 
and private pension sponsors—threatening the viability of 
the pension plans themselves? Since the costs of early retire 
ment policies are relatively low but grow rapidly over time 
(as the trend continues and spreads), some see this situation 
akin to a quiet bomb that is currently dormant but capable 
of suddenly exploding sometime in the future. Already many 
see social security costs out of control. Concern about 
private pension costs may soon follow.
Given these uncertainties (economic instability, problems 
of social security financing, and the trend toward early 
retirement), what can we say about the future? Here we find
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very little agreement among analysts. Of course, such a state 
of affairs is not too surprising. We have learned not to be too 
surprised by the unpredictable, especially given the large 
number of unknown factors surrounding a social 
phenomenon like "the economics of aging." Still, for those 
who have taken more than a passing interest in this area, the 
current situation represents a significant and somewhat 
unexpected watershed.
Some analysts see us at the beginning of a long period of 
economic stagnation and decline. Others see current 
economic problems as just another temporary setback in the 
long-run history of economic growth and the ever-rising pros 
perity that has characterized the American economy for 
more than a century. Economic policies for the aging and 
ultimately the future economic status of the aged depend 
critically on which viewpoint is the more realistic.
Rather than taking sides in this dispute, it may be more 
useful at this point to enumerate some of the key assump 
tions that lie behind the two very different points of view. 
Our ability to finance economic programs for the aged in 
future years will be influenced greatly by the following fac 
tors:
1. The Growth of Real Wages. Until the late Sixties the 
growth in American productivity was relatively high for 
most of the post-World War II period. Since then, however, 
the rate has slackened and in recent years the slowdown has 
been quite dramatic. Moreover, this downturn has not been 
confined to a few special industries but has been experienced 
by a very broad spectrum of industries in the United States. 
Despite much research, economists have not been able to 
satisfactorily explain the changes in productivity that have 
taken place and, as a result, there is currently a great deal of 
uncertainty with regard to what is likely to happen in the 
years ahead.
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Pessimistic projections generally assume that recent ex 
perience results from fundamental changes in the economy 
that are not likely to change quickly. They therefore assume 
that real wage increases based on productivity gains will be 
very low, averaging significantly less than 1.0 percent per 
year.
Optimistic projections, in contrast, assume that the recent 
experience is transient and in large part associated with the 
unexpected economic shocks of the last couple of 
decades—war, OPEC, crop failures, etc. These projections 
assume a return to rates closer to those of the 1940-60 period 
and real wages soon increasing between 1.0 and 2.0 percent 
per year.
2. Unemployment. Intimately relatd to productivity and 
growth is the level of employment. In addition to the general 
economic stagnation depressing employment opportunities, 
pessimists point to an apparent increase in structural prob 
lems associated with the American labor force as its age, sex, 
and race composition changes dramatically and as we shift 
away from manufacturing production and toward services. 
Thus, pessimistic projections assume unemployment will not 
decline to the earlier low levels but will range between 6 and 8 
percent (high by historical standards). Optimistic projections 
assume rates only slightly higher than those of "better 
times"—declining to below 6 percent.
3. Fertility Rates and Mortality. We have witnessed wide 
fluctuations in fertility over the past century, creating an 
unevenness in the population structure and resulting dif 
ficulties in planning (for housing, schools, pensions, etc.) 
The sharp decline in fertility following the "baby boom" of 
the late Forties and early Fifties is currently the cause of 
serious concern with regard to the costs of the elderly 
population in the 21st century. But trends in fertility over the 
next several decades are also important, since they will in
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great part determine the number of working-age persons 
available when the "baby boom" retires.
While most demographers continue to stress the volatility, 
and hence unpredictability, of future fertility, the projec 
tions we make now must guess as to the likely trends. 
Pessimistic projections assume that fertility will continue to 
fall to about 1.6-1.7 children per woman; while the op 
timistic ones assume fertility will increase slightly to 2.1-2.4 
births per woman. (All projections fail to include illegal im 
migration.)
Remaining life expectance at age 65 is currently about 18.0 
years for women and 14.0 years for men, up from 1940 by 
four and two years respectively. For projection purposes, the 
major breakthroughs in prolonging life that some predict are 
generally not made a part of the projections, and almost all 
projections generally assume some continuing but gradual 
improvement in mortaility experience at the later ages. Thus, 
the optimistic and pessimistic projections differ only by rate 
of improvement in life expectancy assumed, and this dif 
ference is typically small.
4. Private Pensions. Private pensions have grown 
dramatically during the post-World War II period—in 
coverage, in types of protection, and in benefit levels provid 
ed. Optimistic projections see this mechanism for income in 
old-age continuing to increase in importance. With liberaliz 
ed tax provisions for IRAs and a variety of new pension op 
tions (e.g., 401 (K) cash-or-deferred plans), private pension 
coverage—and hence pension benefits—are assumed to in 
crease significantly. In contrast, the pessimistic projections 
see pension coverage growing slowly (perhaps even declin 
ing) as a result of (a) government regulations which make 
pensions a much less flexible management tool and raise ad 
ministrative expenses, (b) higher benefit costs arising from 
continuing demands to liberalize benefits, and (c) escalating
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premiums to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation to 
protect against plan termination resulting from industry, and 
hence plan, instability.
5. Health Care Costs. There is now growing awareness 
among analysts and policymakers that the rapid rise in 
health care costs of the recent past is not likely to abate in the 
years to come. With regard to the elderly, most of the atten 
tion is focused on Medicare, which currently finances about 
45 percent of their health care costs and most of acute care 
expenses. Since its enactment, Medicare expenditures have 
grown at a rate far faster than the other social security pro 
grams. In early 1983, the White House issued statistics to 
support President Reagan's "health care incentive reform 
proposal." "This year," said the fact sheet, "Medicare and 
Medicaid will spend more every two weeks than they did dur 
ing the entire year of 1966, their first full year of operation" 
(White House, 1983). If the early retirement bomb is 
threatening us, many would argue that the Medicare bomb 
has already exploded, and the only argument is over how 
many more will follow.
Moreover, there seems to be general agreement among 
analysts that, in the absence of intervention, Medicare costs 
will continue to accelerate in future years. And many think 
that only very fundamental and radical changes in our health 
care delivery system will have any appreciable effect on 
future costs trends. In their Annual Report for 1983, the 
Trustees of the Social Security Administration project ("im 
mediate" assumptions) that Medicare costs will continue 
to grow by 8 to 13 percent over the next two 
decades—significantly faster than the increase in revenues 
from taxable payrolls. The resulting costs (and deficits) are 
huge by any standard of comparison.
The Trustees attribute slightly over half of the annual 
growth in health costs to economic and demographic factors.
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But the rest is expected to result from the continuing cost 
pressures within the health care industry itself—wage setting, 
insurance disincentives, and the costs of new technology. 
Peterson (1983) warns, for example, that the "... new 
medical technologies are priming the HI [Medicare] program 
for a cost explosion without precedent. ..." And Alan 
Greenspan—testifying before the Subcommittee on Social 
Security, U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means 
(February 1, 1983) as Chairman of the National Commission 
on Social Security Reform—warns: "We cannot substantial 
ly constrain the cost of Medicare unless we slow the im 
provements in technology (a dubious goal) or choose not to 
employ the technology that is currently available. These deci 
sions, of course, would raise very difficult ethical and moral 
questions."
Again, projecting future costs becomes a seemingly im 
possible exercise. Munnell (1983), arguing against the 
pessimistic projections of Peterson, counters in the following 
way:
Outlays for HI [Medicare] today account for only 
18 percent of total expenditures under the social 
security program; it is difficult to believe that we 
will allow the HI program to grow to a point where 
the cost for hospital insurance (20 percent of tax 
able payrolls) roughly equals the total cost to sup 
port the aged, disabled, their dependents and sur 
vivors (24 percent of payrolls). [Emphasis added.]
Thus, given agreement over the need for cost constraint, the 
optimists and pessimists tend to differ on how soon and how 
much we will change our health care system.
It is tempting to close by throwing up one's hands in 
frustration and exclaiming, "Who knows what the future 
will bring?" As our survey of the key factors has shown,
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there is clearly much intellectual justification for uncertain 
ty—and anxiety!
Instead, I want to close by adding a reactive note of cau 
tion. In recent years, good economic news has been virtually 
nonexistent. For this and other reasons it is quite clear that 
the pessimistic projections and the problems they portend 
are being taken very seriously these days by "the people that 
count." Given the seriousness in recent years of our general 
economic problems and a number of major problems arising 
in connection with old-age and disability pensions, state and 
local pension financing, private pension reinsurance, and 
Medicare/Medicaid—the possibility of continuing and in 
creasing problems is not likely to be ignored.
And for a number of years now a variety of "solutions" 
or remedial steps have been proposed. The changes are 
almost all pointed in one direction—drastic cutbacks in 
benefits to reduce social security costs. As I have pointed out 
previously (Schluz 1983), the logical question that follows 
from such proposed action is: What else changes in reaction 
to cutbacks in social security (i.e., what takes the place of 
social security)?
In examining the ability of alternatives to pick up the slack 
from a pared down social security program, we should not 
ignore economic history. Despite what Martha Derthick 
(1979) says about bureaucratic elites engineering the expan 
sion of social security, the development of OASDHI was to a 
very large extent a reaction to the failure of the alter 
natives—namely "employment of the old" and "providing 
for old age through personal savings." Both these alter 
natives are largely untenable due to the vicissitudes of our 
economic system over the years:
a) past periods of unemployment and inflation that have 
made preparation for retirement (i.e., financial plan-
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ning) extremely difficult for individuals (if not im 
possible);
b) an inability to achieve sustained full 
employment—except in periods when the nation was 
preparing, fighting, or recovering from war—causing 
the government to actively discourage employment by 
older workers and to develop pension mechanisms 
that encourage retirement; and
c) both social security and private pensions with a long 
history as tools of business management to deal with 
cyclical and long-term shifts in demand (see, e.g., 
Graebner 1980).
What then are the alternatives proposed today? Not surpris 
ingly, we find that they are the same as in the past: private 
saving, private insurance, and employment of the old.
Thus, there is a high probability that the solutions being 
proposed today are simplistic and unworkable. If we cut 
back social security drastically, we are likely to see the 
economic status of the elderly decline over time. More im 
portant, this decline will fall disproportionately on the disad- 
vantaged segments of the population—low income persons, 
women, and minorities who now depend almost entirely on 
social security for their support in old age.
The long term implications of this are quite serious. As 
William Graebner has recently argued, the elderly may be 
viewed by our society as a residual group to remain in or 
move out of the labor force, according to the 
macroeconomic situation:
If elderly people of the turn of the century could 
compare notes with those of us approaching this 
century's end, the two generations might well con-
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elude that, whatever else has changed, the fate of 
the elderly remains the same: to serve the needs of 
other age groups and to be retired, or put back to 
work in the interest of someone else's conception of 
the general welfare (Graebner 1983).
If that is true, then it is quite unlikely that many people in the 
future can actually count on the rosy retirement period (the 
Shangrila) so much the fashion today in the stories of the 
media and the speeches of politicians.
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the Carrot and the Stick*
Why No One Works 
Beyond 65 Anymore
Joseph F. Quinn 
Boston University
Introduction
The topic of this year's Economic Lecture series is the 
Economics of Aging. I am delighted with this choice of 
topic. It is an extremely interesting, important, and timely 
one, and it is one of the few issues on which I have any exper 
tise. There are many aspects of the economics of aging that 
you will hear discussed this year. I have chosen only one of 
them, the retirement decision—"Why No One Works 
Beyond 65 Anymore: the Carrot and the Stick."
The presentation has four parts. I will first point out that 
something is happening. Retirement patterns have changed, 
and changed dramatically. Second, I will speak briefly about 
why this is important. Third, I will ask why this is occurring 
and finally, what we can do about it.
I will concentrate on the third of these. Why is it that these 
changes in retirement patterns are occurring? Why are peo-
*Much of this presentation was drawn from an article by Richard V. Burkhauser (Vander- 
bilt University) and Joseph F. Quinn, "Influencing Retirement Behavior: A Key Issue for 
Social Security," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Fall 1983. More technical 
background material can be found in two earlier papers by the same authors, "Is Man 
datory Retirement Overrated? Evidence from the 1970's," Journal of Human Resources, 
Summer 1983 and "The Effect of Pension Plans on the Pattern of Life-Cycle Compensa 
tion," in The Measurement of Labor Cost (Jack Triplett, editor), NBER Studies in Income 
and Wealth, Volume 48, University of Chicago Press, 1983.
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pie retiring earlier than they used to? I will emphasize only 
one component of the answer to what is obviously a very 
complex question. That component concerns economic in 
centives—incentives imbedded in our social security and pen 
sion systems, incentives that induce retirement, I will argue, 
by penalizing the work effort of older workers. Social securi 
ty and employer pensions impose pay cuts, large pay cuts in 
some cases, on older workers. These cuts do not occur 
through the paycheck, but through a much more subtle but 
no less effective mechanism. Many older workers respond 
exactly how you might expect to the pay cuts—they stop 
working and retire.
Retirement Trends
Table 1 lays out the facts to be explained—the mystery to 
be solved. It includes longitudinal data on labor force par 
ticipation rates from 1950 to 1981, by age and by sex. I draw 
your attention to the last two columns—data for men and 
women aged 55-64 and 65 and over. You will notice here a 
remarkable demographic trend. As recently as 1950, nearly 
half of American men over 64 were still in the labor force. 
A mere 30 years later, that proportion is down to less than 
1 in 5.
Obviously, my title is a bit inaccurate. It is not true that 
nobody works beyond 65 anymore, but it is true that what 
was once a very common phenomenon, men over 65 work 
ing, is now relatively rare.
For the next category of men, 55-64, people of early retire 
ment age, the pattern is similar though less dramatic. Within 
these same 30 years, the proportion still in the labor force 
has dropped from near 90 percent to near 70 percent. 
Something is happening.
As you can see, the statistics for women are quite dif 
ferent. The reason is that there are two trends underway
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simultaneously. First, folks are retiring earlier. But second, 
more women are working than used to. These trends tend to 
offset each other for women over 65. The participation rate 
has stayed in the 8 to 10 percent range since 1950. For 
women of early retirement age, the increased labor force par 
ticipation has dominated the early retirement trend, and the 
proportion working has grown from 27 to 41 percent.
Table 1
Labor Force Participation Rates 





























































































SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Report of the President 
(1982).
Chart 1 is a picture of the same phenomenon, except that 
it uses individual ages rather than broad categories. If we 
define normal retirement age as the age at which half of the 
cohort are out of the labor force, we can use this chart to
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Chart 1
Labor Force Participation Rates 
Males and Females, 1950 to 1982
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION BY AGE
Molea. 195O — 1982
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION BY AGE
Femoles, 1950 — 1982
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show what has happened to normal retirement age over these 
years. Back in 1950, for example, it was not until age 70 that 
half the men were out of the labor force. By 1970, 20 years 
later, 65 was the age at which half the men had withdrawn. 
Today that age is below 63. As you have seen, the picture for 
women is different. Despite a downturn in the early 1970s, a 
time, by the way, when social security benefits rose 
dramatically in real terms, the general trend for women has 
been up or steady, even in the oldest categories.
When one aggregates men and women, which I have not 
done here, the conclusion is clear: people are retiring earlier 
than they used to. Our mission, should we decide to accept 
it, is to find out why people retire when they do. It may be 
that people retire when they have to, when debilitating health 
problems or mandatory retirement rules drive them from 
their jobs. On the other hand, people may retire when they 
choose to. They face financial incentives that encourage 
retirement, and many may be induced to do so.
A Source of Concern?
My second question is "why is this an issue?"—a polite 
way of asking "who cares?" Until recently, I think there was 
no particular alarm over these retirement trends. If anything, 
they were applauded. One of the goals of the early architects 
of the social security system, it has been argued, was to in 
duce older workers out of the very weak labor markets of the 
1930s.
But that goal, I suspect, faded during the war years and 
the more prosperous decades that followed. Nonetheless, 
this trend towards early retirement was viewed as a logical 
development in an increasingly wealthy society. Some of this 
wealth was spent on leisure, and some of this leisure was 
taken in the form of early retirement.
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But this retirement trend is no longer viewed as benign for 
at least two reasons. One is the financial crisis facing social 
security. The social security trust funds are basically nonexis 
tent these days. Current receipts from social security con 
tributors are paid directly to current recipients. It is a pay-as- 
you-go system. There is nothing wrong with a pay-as-you-go 
system as long as future receipts are adequate to meet future 
obligations. But this was recently not the case.
Some of the social security funding crisis was a temporary 
phenomenon due to the recessionary years of the 1970s—if 
you are willing to call more than a decade of recession tem 
porary. But part of the crisis is also due to these trends 
towards early retirement and to the early receipt of benefits 
by recipients.
The other reason for concern is anything but temporary. It 
derives from the well-known demographic fact that the age 
structure of America is changing. Currently, about 11 per 
cent of our population is 65 or older. By 2025, this will grow 
to between 17 and 20 percent. The whole country will soon 
look like Florida, not with respect to winter weather, unfor 
tunately for you Michigan residents, but with respect to the 
age distribution.
Even without changing retirement patterns, fewer workers 
per retiree would put strains on the social security system, 
implying either higher taxes for contributors, lower benefits 
for recipients, or both. When this demographic trend is com 
bined with the fact that people are retiring earlier, the prob 
lems are compounded.
I think that older workers will be very much needed in the 
labor force of the future because they will be a larger propor 
tion of the population. I fear that the elderly may be unwill 
ing to work unless the financial incentives that I will discuss 
this evening are changed.
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Retirement Determinants
In 1977, Congress changed the age of earliest mandatory 
retirement from 65 to 70. With a couple of minor exceptions, 
it is now illegal to have a mandatory retirement prior to age 
70. Many people, including President Reagan and Rep. 
Claude Pepper, a leading spokesman for older American in 
Congress, favor outlawing mandatory retirement altogether. 
The entire concept may be legislated out of existence.
An interesting research question is whether this would 
make a difference. At first blush, it appears that it would. 
Prior to 1977, mandatory retirement provisions were a 
widespread phenomenon in the U.S. Between 40 and 50 per 
cent of workers faced them, and many people retired at their 
mandatory retirement age. When one compares the behavior 
of people with and without mandatory retirement, their 
behavior is quite different.
Richard Burkhauser and I followed a sample of employed 
older workers (aged 62 to 64 in 1983, drawn from the Social 
Security Administration's Retirement History Study (RHS)) 
over a two-year period during which some of them faced 
mandatory retirement. Of those who did, only 17 percent 
were still working in 1975. Of those who did not face man 
datory retirement, nearly 60 percent were still employed. 
This is a big difference in behavior and a large potential 
mandatory retirement effect.
But coincidence does not imply causation. I will argue 
tonight that there are important financial incentives that go 
into effect (or increase in magnitude) at exactly the same 
time that mandatory retirement occurs. It is difficult to say 
without considerable investigation that mandatory retire 
ment was the reason why these people retired when they did. 
It is not easy to discern "who dunnit?" or in this case "what 
dunnit?"
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Social security, pensions and mandatory retirement are all 
very closely intertwined. It is extremely important to under 
stand how each of these determinants (and others, such as 
health, marital status, attitudes and expectations) influence 
the retirement decision. Why is it important? If mandatory 
retirement was forcing people out of the labor force at age 
65, then a change in the mandatory retirement law, as we had 
in 1977, or its outright elimination will have a substantial im 
pact on aggregate behavior. On the other hand, if it was not 
mandatory retirement but other factors that occur at the 
same time, then changing the mandatory retirement law will 
have very little effect on retirement trends.
Mandatory retirement and pensions tend to come hand 
and hand. In the sample of older workers mentioned above, 
nearly all (91 percent) of those facing mandatory retirement 
also had pensions. Most became eligible at exactly the same 
time as mandatory retirement and most were eligible for full 
rather than reduced benefits at that time. On the other hand, 
of those people who were not subject to mandatory retire 
ment, fewer than half (47 percent) had pensions. If pensions 
induce people to retire, and I think they do, then much of 
what may look like a mandatory retirement effect may be the 
impact of these pensions.
Mandatory retirement and social security are even easier 
to link. The age of full social security eligibility is age 65. 
That is also the age, we will see, when a very important 
change in the social security law occurs. This change will 
play a key role in solving the mystery below.
Age 65 is important for another reason. Prior to 1977, this 
was by far the most popular age for mandatory retirement. 
If social security induces people to retire, and I think it does, 
much of its effect might also be attributed to mandatory 
retirement.
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Let's look at the modus operand! of our suspects. Man 
datory retirement is the simplest, although there are 
subtleties in some of the provisions. They generally state that 
an individual must leave the job when turning a certain age, 
or at the end of that calendar year. It is a straightforward 
and blunt instrument. It is the "stick" of the title of this 
talk.
Social security and employer pensions, on the other hand, 
are promises of income streams in the future. They are very 
complicated promises, and have many important dimen 
sions, such as the age of eligibility, the size of the retirement 
benefit, whether that amount is adjusted for inflation after 
retirement, and what happens to that amount if one decides 
to delay retirement and continue working.
All of these aspects of the retirement contract are impor 
tant determinants of how valuable these promises are. In em 
pirical work, one must describe these complicated ar 
rangements in a simple summary form. How big are an in 
dividual's pension and social security rights? The most 
popular way to answer this question is in terms of the annual 
benefit; for example, $6,000 per year. But that answer ig 
nores other aspects of the pension that are extremely impor 
tant. It says nothing about when one is eligible. It says 
nothing about what happens to the benefit after retirement. 
Is the $6,000 fixed, or does it grow with the cost of living? 
And what happens to the benefit if one decides to forgo the 
pension and work another year? Will the annual benefit in 
crease, and if so, by how much?
A far superior summary statistic of the value of a pension 
is the wealth or asset equivalent of that promise. In 
economists' terms, it is the present discounted value of the 
future income stream—the amount of money that would 
have to be invested today to provide exactly the income 
stream that is promised. Because investments pay interest,
66
dollars promised farther and farther in the future are the 
equivalent to smaller and smaller amounts today.
As an example, with an interest rate of 10 percent, an in 
vestment of $60,000 would provide an annual income of 
$6,000 forever. A gift of $60,000 and a gift of $6,000 per 
year forever are exactly equivalent, given the 10 percent in 
terest rate. By lending or borrowing, one could always turn 
either one into the other.
If $6,000 annual income will not last forever (for example, 
it terminates at death) then the asset equivalent is less than 
$60,000. The precise amount can easily be calculated.
There are tremendous advantages to defining the value of 
social security or pension promises in terms of their asset 
equivalent. First, the age of eligibility is important. The far 
ther away it is, the lower current asset value of a given an 
nual benefit.
In addition, inflation protection is easily incorporated into 
this calculation, via the discount rate that translates future 
dollars into today's dollars. Indexed benefits are discounted 
at the real rate of interest, whereas nominal benefits that do 
not grow with the cost of living are discounted at the 
nominal rate—the real rate plus the rate of inflation.
With the concept of present discounted value in mind, let 
me ask the following question. The answer to this question is 
key to my view of the financial incentives in our pension 
plans. Suppose an individual is currently eligible for retire 
ment benefits of $6,000 per year until death. What happens 
to this annual benefit if the individual instead chooses to re 
main on the job and work another year?
There is good news and bad news. The bad news, with 
respect to the pension, is that the individual loses the $6,000. 
One does not draw pension benefits while continuing on the
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job. The good news is that future annual benefits (employer 
pension or social security) are likely to exceed $6,000 because 
of that additional year of work.
Why are they higher? It is important to understand this. 
With respect to social security, future benefits increase for 
two reasons. First, annual benefits are based on a social 
security concept called average monthly earnings. With an 
additional year of work, average monthly earnings will rise, 
as will the subsequent benefit calculation.
In addition, there is a second reason—an actuarial adjust 
ment, which is basically a reward from the Social Security 
Administration for claiming checks for one fewer year. Be 
tween 62, the earliest age of social security eligibility, and 65, 
the actuarial adjustment is about 7 percent per year of delay. 
At 65, prior to 1983, it dropped to 1 percent. This adjust 
ment applies to all future checks. Most people recognize it in 
a slightly different form. Anyone contemplating retirement 
realizes that retirement at 62, the earliest age, rather than 
three years later, the normal age, entails a benefit reduction 
of 20 percent. This 20 percent is approximately three times 
the 7 percent annual figure that I have introduced.
Employer pensions are more complicated, because there 
are thousands of them, and each has its own individual re 
quirements, rules and regulations. But pension benefits are 
usually based on either years of service or on average earn 
ings over the last few years with the firm. Either of these is 
likely to grow with an additional year of work. In addition, 
some pension plans also have actuarial adjustments similar 
to that I described for social security.
The pension implication of the choice to retire or to work 
another year is not as simple as the choice between $6,000 
and zero. It is a choice between two pension streams—one 
that begins immediately and provides $6,000 per year, and
another that pays nothing in the first year, but higher annual 
benefits (say, $6,500) in the future. Which one of these 
streams is worth more? It depends—always a safe answer in 
economics. It depends on whether the future $500 annual in 
crements are sufficient to compensate for the $6,000 loss in 
the first year.
It is difficult to decide by looking at the streams, since the 
amounts arrive at different times. But as soon as they are 
translated into present discounted value, the answer is 
clear—the stream with the higher asset equivalent.
Suppose today's value of the first stream ($6,000, $6,000, 
$6,000, etc.) is $45,000, and the second ($0, $6,500, $6,500, 
etc.) is $50,000. Then working another year yields two 
benefits—paychecks for that year, which is certainly good 
news, and a $5,000 increase in the value of pension (or social 
security) rights. The latter increases by $5,000 because of the 
decision to work that year. As such, it is really a component 
of compensation. If the straight salary was $20,000 for the 
year, the true compensation was $25,000—$20,000 plus the 
$5,000 increment in pension wealth.
Unfortunately, it can work both ways. Suppose the pres 
ent discounted value of the second stream were $40,000 
rather than $50,000. What would true compensation be 
then? While the individual earns $20,000 in salary, the value 
of the pension rights drops by $5,000. Th true compensation 
is only $15,000 for the year of work.
An interesting question is which of these two scenarios is 
more likely to describe the situation facing older workers to 
day. Before presenting some actual data, let me just sum 
marize the results and describe the bottom line. Social securi 
ty and many pensions are structured so that at some 
point—and certainly by 65—the second scenario holds. The 
present discounted value of social security and employer 
pension rights begin to decrease with continued work. One
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pocket is filled by paychecks, while the other is picked by 
social security and pension rules. One's true compensation is 
less than it looks. This is the surreptitious pay cut I alluded 
to in the introduction.
When do these losses occur? They occur at different times 
for different people. But a major change in the incentives 
happens at age 65—precisely the age at which mandatory 
retirement was most likely to go into effect back when the 
Retirement History sample was being studied. This 
simultaneity makes it difficult, through not impossible, to 
discern exactly what was influencing individual behavior. 
Was it mandatory retirement, "the stick," or these financial 
incentives, "the carrot"—the pay cuts that often accompany 
age 65?
Table 2 shows actual data for a sample of employed men 
aged 63 to 65 in 1974. It illustrates what would have happen 
ed to the present discounted values of pension (top) and 
social security (bottom) rights if these workers had chosen to 
work another year. For 63 year old men, for example, there 
is relatively little change in the asset value of pensions. 
Similar proportions have them increased and decreased (the 
median is -$148), and most of the change is less than $1,000. 
(The 43 percent "unchanged" are those not eligible for pen 
sions.)
At age 64, however, there are significantly more losers 
than gainers, and the size of the losses has increased. The 
median person, ignoring those unchanged, would lose over 
$1,100 in pension wealth. By age 65, nearly everyone loses 
and the median loss exceeds $2,000.
The changes in social security wealth are much more 
dramatic. Until 65, the median person gains—over $1,800 at 
age 63 and $800 at 64. But at 65, beware. Everyone would 
lose social security wealth with continued work. The median 
loss for this particular sample of men was over $3,000.
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Table 2
Changes in Present Valueaof Employer Pensions
and Social Security Associated with an Additional Year
of Work, for Full-Time Employed Men
Age 63 to 65 in 1974
(Distribution in percent)
Employer pensions


















































































SOURCES: Data from the Retirement History Study of Social Security Administration;
calculations by Burkhauser and Quinn.
a. Present values calculated with a 5 percent discount rate.
b. Median calculation omits those with no change.
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Why the big change at 65? The reason is the legislated 
decrease in the actuarial adjustment, from 7 percent per year 
of delay between 62 and 64 to only 1 percent (in 1974) for 
each year of postponement after 65. The social security 
reward for continued work decreased dramatically, and 
became insufficient to compensate for a year of foregone 
benefits.
Whether these gains and losses are considered big depends 
on the object of comparison. Table 3 compares them to the 
individual's before-tax earnings. It calculates the wealth 
changes as a percent of salary.
The top half of the table refers to people who do not have 
pensions and are eligible for social security only. As was seen 
in table 2, the median person gains social security wealth at 
63 and at 64, but loses substantially at 65. The median loss in 
this sample is estimated to equal about a third of an annual 
salary.
Below are individuals eligible for both social security and 
pensions. At the median, there is a modest net gain in total 
retirement income wealth at 63, a small loss at 64, and a 
dramatic loss at 65. The median 65 year old in this sample 
would be working for approximately half pay because of the 
penalties implicit in the social security and pension systems.
These estimates are very rough, and may exaggerate the 
size of the pay cut. They ignore issues of taxation, and 
assume that anybody who works full time loses all social 
security benefits. In fact, with low enough earnings, one can 
both work and collect social security benefits. The point of 
the table is that the work disincentives can be large. And 
keep in mind that there are distributions around these me 




Changes in Present Value of Employer Pensions
and Social Security Associated with an Additional Year
of Work, as a Percentage of Annual Before Tax Earnings,
for Full-Time Employed Men
Age 63 to 65 in 1974
(Distribution in percent)
Eligible for social security only
Loss of 30 percent or more
10 to 30 percent
1 to 10 percent
Gain of 0 to 10 percent
10 to 20 percent
20 to 30 percent







































Eligible for social security and employer pension
Loss of 30 percent or more
10 to 30 percent
1 to 10 percent
Gain of 0 to 10 percent
Total
Median
10 to 20 percent
20 to 30 percent





























SOURCES: Data from the Retirement History Study of Social Security Administration; 
calculations by Burkhauser and Quinn.
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Let me summarize what we have seen thus far. I am con 
vinced that there are financial incentives to retire. At some 
age—certainly by 65, but earlier for many people—the 
values of social security and pension rights begin to decline if 
one continues to work.
Second, these work disincentives can be large relative to 
the paycheck. Third, these work disincentives grow 
significantly in magnitude at age 65, precisely the age of 
mandatory retirement prior to the 1977 legislation.
What I have not yet shown is that these incentives affect 
people's behavior. For that to occur, people must under 
stand them and respond to them. Richard Burkhauser and I 
have analyzed the impact of these incentives, using samples 
of older workers drawn from the Retirement History Study, 
and find strong evidence that this is the case. Variables 
describing the size of social security and pension wealth 
changes associated with continued work are very significant 
in explaining differences in individual retirement behavior. 
The larger the wealth losses, the more likely people are to 
withdraw from the labor force and retire. The people in the 
sample certainly behave as though they understand and res 
pond to financial incentives.
I can summarize about four years of research in a simple 
analogy—much as I hate to admit it. Consider the following 
contract. For any hour that you work before noon, you will 
be paid $10 per hour; for any hour you work after noon, you 
will be paid $6 per hour. How would you respond? Most 
people would try to pack all the work hours in before noon 
and head for the beach in the afternoon.
To oversimplify a bit, this is exactly what social security 
and pension systems do, except that noon is age 65. After age 
65, or earlier for some, true compensation decreases because 
social security and pension rights become less and less
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valuable with continued work. This occurs because higher 
benefits in the future do not adequately compensate for 
benefits foregone today.
Burkhauser and I have also found that about half of the 
difference in behavior we observed between people who did 
and did not have mandatory retirement could be explained 
by other factors, primarily the financial incentives I have 
described. Mandatory retirement is nowhere near as impor 
tant as it looks. We predict, therefore, that changing the law, 
as we did in 1977, or eliminating mandatory retirement 
altogether would have only a modest effect on aggregate 
behavior.
Changing the mandatory retirement law was a good idea, 
because people who really want to remain at their jobs can 
do so—at least until age 70. But, I think it will have only 
small impact on retirement patterns. Why? I return to the 
title of this talk—"the Carrot and the Stick." Even if depriv 
ed of the stick, mandatory retirement, employers still retain 
the carrot, the incentives built into their pensions systems. 
Mandatory retirement and actuarially unfair pension 
systems are alternative means to the same end.
To change retirement behavior, it is essential to change the 
incentives. To some extent we already have. The 1 percent 
actuarial adjustment that social security applies after age 65 
has already been increased in 1982 to 3 percent per year of 
delay. Although this is still far from actuarially fair, it does 
decrease the size of the work disincentives, and is a move in 
the right direction.
The incentives will be changed even further by a rarely 
publicized and little understood part of the legislation passed 
in April of 1983. This legislation delayed the cost of living 
adjustment for social security recipients for six months. It in 
troduced the taxation of the social security benefits of high
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income recipients. It proposes delaying the age of full social 
security eligibility from 65 to 67 by the year 2027. But most 
important from our perspective, it increases the actuarial ad 
justment from 3 to 8 percent over a twenty year period begin 
ning in 1990. This may seem like a minor component of the 
legislation, but I think it is an important one. It makes social 
security wealth much less dependent on the age of retire 
ment, and significantly decreases the size of the implicit pay 
cuts accompanying old age.
As an economist, I believe that people respond to financial 
incentives. My research confirms this. However, I will be the 
first to admit, if you haven't beaten me to it, that people re 
spond to many other things as well. I do not mean to imply 
that this is the whole story of retirement—the whole answer 
is the question of why people retire when they do. Attitudes 
towards work are very important, as are health status, living 
arrangements, and expectations about the future. But the in 
centives that I have described tonight are also important. 
And they are more easily changed by public policy, such as 
legislation, than many of the other determinants. 
Acknowledging the incentives that are hidden in our pension 
and social security systems is essential to understanding what 




Inflation and the Economic 
Well-Being of Older Americans*
Robert Clark 
and
Daniel A. Sumner 
North Carolina State University
Introduction
It has long been believed that the elderly have fixed or con 
stant incomes and thus are more adversely affected by infla 
tion than other demographic groups. For example, at the 
beginning of the 1970s, Arthur Okun (1970, p. 14) concluded 
that the "... retired aged are the only major specific 
demographic group of Americans that I can confidently 
identify as income losers," in response to inflation. Il 
lustrating the continuing prevalence of this view is the assess 
ment of the 1981 White House Conference on Aging, which 
stated in its final report (p. 27, 30) that "the elderly are par 
ticularly vulnerable to loss from inflation" and that "reduc 
ed inflation is especially beneficial to retired persons because 
it allows them to be better able to take care of themselves." 
These comments express a widely believed conclusion that 
has influenced the development of public policy toward the 
elderly. During the past few years, that belief has been 
challenged in the public press and in scholarly papers. This 
paper contributes to an understanding of the response of the 
income of the elderly to rising prices, and documents the ex 
perience of the 1970s.
*This paper, presented by Robert Clark, was based in part on research reported in more 
detail in R.L. Clark, G.L. Maddox, R.A. Schrimper, and D.A. Sumner, Inflation and the 
Economic Well-Being of the Elderly. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.)
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The hypothesis that the elderly are more vulnerable to in 
flation is carefully examined in this paper and then rejected. 
The mistake in the above argument is assuming that older 
persons live on fixed incomes. In the recent past, the major 
income sources of the elderly have been earnings, social 
security payments, pensions, other federal transfer programs 
and returns on accumulated assets. Wages and interest rates 
that the elderly earn rise with expected inflation just as for 
the rest of the population. Explicit indexation, ad hoc ad 
justments, and in-kind benefit payments have maintained 
the real value of federally administered transfers to the elder 
ly. Employer pension benefits also tend to rise with inflation, 
though these do not seem to have kept pace with price in 
creases. Finally, informal transfers from family and con 
sumption from accumulated durable assets are hard to 
measure but make up a significant factor in the well-being of 
the elderly. Since most of the sources of income for the elder 
ly are not fixed but increase along with price increases, the 
real questions are the changes in elderly income relative to 
changes in the price of goods they purchase and relative to 
the incomes of other groups and the diversity in consump 
tion and income among older persons.
Our measures of economic well-being indicate that real in 
come of older persons rose during much of the 1970s. This 
rising real income for persons in the older age groups pro 
duced an increase in real consumption for most of the elder 
ly. By contrast, wage increases did not keep up with infla 
tion, so the median weekly real earnings of most groups of 
full-time wage and salary workers were approximately 10 
percent lower in 1981 than in 1973. As a result the income of 
the elderly as a percent of income of the total population 
rose. Thus, during the past inflationary decade, the real and 
relative economic status of the elderly improved. These con 
clusions are based on comparing the experience of different 
sets of elderly households over time. Changes in real incomes
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and expenditures for the same set of households in a cohort 
were negative; but this is not the result of inflation, rather it 
is a part of life-cycle patterns in income and spending.
A review of the experience of the 1970s will be helpful in 
understanding the future only if general relationships can be 
identified. Thus, in examining each source of income, we ex 
amine past changes in response to inflation and the adjust 
ment mechanism. In the final section, we reexamine these 
general relationships in an attempt to assess the vulnerability 
of the elderly to price changes in the 1980s.
Measuring Well-Being and Inflation
In order to examine the effect of inflation on well-being, a 
measure of well-being must be adopted. We use the prin 
ciples of a subjective utility function or satisfaction index as 
our general measure of well-being. Individuals and families 
are assumed to allocate their productive resources to earn in 
come and to allocate their income and time among goods 
and services to make themselves as well off as possible. For 
detailed discussions of utility maximization see textbooks by 
Layard and Walters (1978) or Henderson and Quandt 
(1980). The concept of economic welfare is discussed and ap 
plied in Moon and Smolensky (1977).
Changes in prices affect both sides of the income- 
expenditure relationship. For most families wage and in 
terest rates are the most important prices on the income side, 
but other prices also directly affect the incomes of farmers 
and other self-employed persons. The amount of goods and 
services people may consume with their limited resources 
also depends on prices. Prices that matter most are, of 
course, those of the goods with the largest budget shares. 
These budget shares vary from household to household 
because of differences in age, income and other factors.
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Most transactions in our economy use dollars to measure 
the goods and services being traded. Absolute or money 
prices are the rates of exchange between dollars and par 
ticular goods and services. The general price level or the level 
of the price index is an average level of the money prices in 
the economy. This average, however, must be compared to 
something to be meaningful. Typically, the general price 
level is compared to past price levels or to prices in other 
countries or regions. Inflation is the ratio of the sustained in 
crease in the general level of prices compared to past levels. 
It might be thought of as a shrinking of the measuring rod 
we use to measure incomes and expenditures. To say that the 
prices of goods and services in general have risen is to say 
that the value of a unit of money has fallen. The magnitude 
of this decline is indicated by an increase in the price index.
Several indicators are available for measuring the increase 
in prices in the United States. Throughout this analysis we 
use the consumer price index (CPI) as our indicator of price 
changes. Wahl (1982) and Kahn (1982) recently have debated 
the use of the consumer price index as a measure of inflation. 
It is generally agreed that changes in the CPI have tended to 
overstate the rate of inflation in the United States. Thus, an 
upward trend in real income will be understated if nominal 
income is deflated by the CPI, but for our purposes this 
problem is not severe. For a discussion of the CPI and other 
measures of price changes in the context of the elderly, see 
Clark et al. (1981).
Information about price changes is valuable but costly, so 
consumers and producers use resources to discover how 
prices have changed. For example, a workers who received a 
wage increase may not know if the wages of workers in other 
firms or occupations have risen. She may then not know if a 
change of employers would be in her interest without search 
ing in the labor market. Especially with variable rates of in 
flation, the cost of gathering price information and the costs
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of mistakes in allocation may be quite sizable. If all prices 
rise in exact proportion, and if we all knew that this was hap 
pening, inflation would have little effect because we would 
design our institutions and transactions in a way so as to 
nullify the influence of these price changes. But in any 
economy, relative prices of goods and services are constantly 
changing along with wages and other determinants of con 
sumer incomes. In response, people change the quantities of 
goods and services they buy and sell. They also change hours 
of work, occupations, and other determinants of income. 
With inflation added to normal movement of relative prices, 
allocative mistakes are more common and this constitutes a 
real cost of inflation in the economy (Dornbusch and Fischer 
1981, Gordon 1981).
When people have the opportunity to substitute goods that 
have become cheaper for goods that become more expensive, 
they often can mitigate the negative effects of price changes. 
In fact, if nominal prices and incomes change in a way that 
leaves the original consumption bundle available, the con 
sumer could always be better off after the price change. One 
of the major shortcomings of the CPI as a measure of the 
cost of living is that it does not allow for substitution in 
response to changes in relative prices.
Major factors in understanding the effects of inflation are: 
(a) the accuracy of anticipation of inflation, (b) confusion 
between relative price changes and inflation, and (c) (as an 
important corollary to the above) the speed and cost of in 
stitutional adjustments to inflation. If high rates of inflation 
were to persist, perceptions, expectations and institutions 
would more fully reflect potential inflation and its effect 
would be mitigated. This very important distinction between 
anticipated inflation and actual inflation should be kept in 
mind in any discussion of the effects of inflation and 
especially in drawing conclusions from past inflations about 
the potential effects of future inflations.
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Income and Expenditures of the Elderly 
and Their Sensitivities to Inflation
The major sources of income of elderly households in the 
United States are labor market earnings, social security, 
employer pensions, government cash transfers, private cash 
transfers, in-kind government transfers, asset income and 
the use of consumer durables. Some of these income sources 
are effectively fixed by past choices and circumstances, 
whereas others are responsive to current decisions. Some 
decisions are adjusted to changes in the economic environ 
ment facing the family (such as changes in actual or an 
ticipated rates of inflation) whereas fixed income sources re 
spond to changes in the economic environment only through 
institutional or other channels outside a person's direct con 
trol.
The elderly might be distinguished from others by their 
shares of income derived from each of the sources. For ex 
ample, almost all persons over 65 receive some social security 
payments, which are now indexed for inflation. But shares 
of social security income vary widely among the elderly—for 
some it is the major income source, for others only a minor 
supplement. Another income source almost universal in 
coverage is medicare benefits, which form a part of the in- 
kind government transfers. The importance of medicare 
depends on the total amount of income available and also on 
the health of the elderly family. Since this transfer is an in- 
kind benefit, it is also effectively protected from inflation. 
Note that as is true for all in-kind transfers, the relative price 
of the commodity is affected by the form of the transfer.
Income received in the form of specified quantities of con 
sumed goods and services is particularly hard to evaluate. 
Consider medical services, for example. A household that is 
eligible for medicare has received a low- (perhaps zero-) pric-
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ed insurance plan. Part of the household's income is the 
value of this insurance. Even if a market value for the in 
surance could be established, however, some households 
would not have purchased it at that price. Thus, the 
household's income is overestimated in valuing medicare at 
its market value.
These income sources do not depend directly on the cur 
rent choices of the elderly, but others do depend on in 
dividual choice. The choice to retire or to change hours of 
work are potentially flexible, and the wage earned will be af 
fected by inflation. The value of pension benefits and the 
decision to accept pensions are also affected by current and 
anticipated inflation.
Changes in wealth and income from changes in the prices 
of assets and durable goods affect potential consumption 
and well-being in each period, even if the asset is not sold 
and the capital gain is not realized. Take housing services, 
for example. For a family owning the house in which it 
resides, part of its total income is the service flow in each 
period from the house. The family housing expenditure in 
cludes use of the house (rather than renting or selling it). An 
unanticipated increase in the price of houses increases 
wealth, but on the expenditure side it also increases the value 
of the service flow of housing received and hence the "ex 
penditure" on housing.
These examples illustrate that inflation may affect the 
elderly differently from other families and that this effect 
will not be homogeneous among different segments of the 
elderly population. The amounts and shares of income 
received from each source and the decisions about work and 
other investments determine these differential impacts.
Consumption patterns of the elderly may also differ from 
the rest of the population. Consumption may be decompos-
84
ed as current purchases of goods and services, service flows 
from durables, private in-kind transfers, government in-kind 
transfers, net savings, and taxes and government services. 
The issue of taxes is usually dealt with either by using net 
after-tax income or by letting taxes be an expenditure 
category. If income tax payments are thought of as a pay 
ment for services, then gross income is the measure of in 
come and taxes are one of the expenditure categories.
Given stocks of assets and income, the consumer makes a 
consumption-savings decision (that is, how much to add or 
subtract from net wealth) and a portfolio decision (that is, 
how to allocate savings or dissavings between assets and con 
sumer durables). The saving decision of the household 
depends on the expected inflation-adjusted interest rate and 
other factors like expected length of life. The consumer also 
decides the allocation of current consumption among the 
potential goods and services. Allocation of consumption 
depends on the total income to be allocated, prices, and the 
other constraints that may be placed on the household. An 
example of these other constraints is the amount and form of 
in-kind income. Inflation may affect the consumption bun 
dle by affecting relative prices, real current income, or other 
constraints that apply to the household.
Putting the income and expenditure together allows an ac 
counting of the effect of inflation on potential consumption. 
In application to elderly Americans, specific facts about in 
stitutions, behavior patterns, and relative price changes are 
considered. This framework does not formally incorporate 
the increase in costs of mistakes in allocation of resource that 
follow necessarily from anticipated price changes. Nor does 
it incorporate the cost of additional resources spent to ac 
quire the process information about price changes.
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Measuring the Real Income of the Elderly 
with the Retirement History Study
This section reports changes in income of older persons us 
ing populations from the Retirement History Study (RHS). 
We show the pattern of income as these groups lived through 
the inflationary period of the early 1970s. Examining the in 
come of a group of older persons as they age will show the 
influences of lifecycle decisions along with changing 
economic conditions.
The RHS is a series of surveys conducted for the Social 
Security Administration using respondents aged 58-63 in 
1969. Married men, nonmarried men, and nonmarried 
women were interviewed every two years. For this analysis, 
we use data from the 1969, 1971, 1973 and 1975 surveys. A 
comprehensive list of income, work and health questions was 
asked of over 11,000 respondents. The RHS has become the 
most widely used data for examining the income and work 
patterns of older persons (Irelan 1972). In each interview, 
respondents were asked detailed questions concerning their 
cash income in the preceding year. We focus on average 
nominal and real income for married couples.
This cohort analysis reveals significant declines in income 
with aging as earnings decline in response to reduced labor 
supply. This expected lifecycle pattern of income must not be 
confused with an inflation effect. The limited evidence sug 
gests that the real income of older persons remained fairly 
stable during the years before retirement and through the 
retirement period.
Real Income Patterns
The sources of income in the RHS used to determine fami 
ly income are earnings, social security, employer pensions,
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other governmental cash transfers, and asset income. The 
RHS survey does not include enough information to assess 
carefully the movements in other income sources. Earnings 
are shown separately for husband and wife and represent 
both wage and self-employment earnings. The other transfer 
income includes income from disability and welfare pro 
grams. Asset income is composed of income from rent, stock 
and bonds, and savings accounts.
The sample population of families consists of all husband 
and wife couples that remained together throughout the 
survey period; i.e., only those couples interviewed in every 
survey year are included in the base sample. The mean for 
each income source is calculated from the set of respondents 
with useable answers to the question concerning the specific 
income source in question including zero values.
Table 1 shows the income history of husband-wife couples 
as the ages of the husbands rise from 57 to 62 in 1968 to 63 to 
68 years old by 1974. The mean nominal income of $9,773 in 
1968 falls slightly over the six-year period to $9,129 in 1974. 
During this period, the consumer price index (CPI) rose 
from 104.2 to 147.7. As a result, the real income in 1967 
dollars of this sample declined sharply from $9,380 to 
$6,181, a fall of 34 percent. The decline in real income occurs 
in response to inflation and changes in other economic con 
ditions that alter the real returns to assets and labor supply. 
But the income pattern mostly reflects individual lifecycle 
decisions, especially declining hours of work in old age.
The changing composition of income is of particular in- 
terst to this study. In 1968, earnings represented 88.2 percent 
of family income; however, by 1974, nominal earnings of the 
husband had dropped by almost half, and family earnings 
accounted for only 45.0 percent of total income. This decline 
is primarily the result of fewer hours worked per workers 
and fewer workers. These are expected lifecycle patterns. But
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the earnings decline is also influenced by changing real wages 
and family income, which may be altered by inflation. 
Though earnings are less important to the elderly, even when 
the husbands are aged 64 to 69, they comprise half of the 
average family income.
Table 1
Mean Income for Couples in Retirement History Survey 
1968-74




Social security income. ....
Pension income ..........
Other government transfers 
Asset income ............
Total nominal income .....






































SOURCE: Retirement History Study, 1969-75 interviews.
a. Values in 1967 dollars as measured by the consumer price index.
Employer pension and social security benefits account for 
an increasing proportion of average family income as the 
household ages. Pensions represented 3.5 percent and social 
security 1.9 percent of family income in 1968, but they in 
crease in importance to 18.7 and 23.0 percent, respectively, 
in 1974. Growth in the mean pension and social security in 
come is primarily attributable to the increased proportion of 
persons receiving these payments. Inflation may alter pen 
sion income by influencing labor supply choices and by 
reducing the real value of a given nominal pension. Other 
monetary government transfers represent less than 3.0 per-
cent of income in all years. The effect of inflation on this 
form of income depends on the government response to 
higher prices in the form of increased benefits.
The significant rise in mean asset income between 1968 
and 1972, while the average age of the sample increases for 
60 to 64 years, is consistent with a growth in personal wealth 
in the years immediately prior to retirement. Hurd and 
Shoven (1982b) found that the real value of stocks and bonds 
for RHS couples fell, but the real value of bank accounts 
rose. Real income from current assets depends on the rate of 
return compared with the change in prices. The elderly ex 
perience inflation effects different from others only if the 
makeup of their investment portfolios differs.
Table 1 suggests that the fall in real income is due primari 
ly to the change in labor market income. This finding is sup 
ported by the data in Table 2, which shows real income is 
fairly stable during the final work years, declines at retire 
ment, and then remains constant during the retirement years. 
Disaggregating this sample by age of husband, race and 
residence reveals a similar pattern of decline in real income 
with age. This decline and changing composition of income 
is also observed for nonmarried men and women. This con 
clusion is further supported by an examination of older 
cohorts in the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics and of 
respondents in the 1972-73 Consumer Expenditure Survey 
(see Clark et al., 1984). These findings concerning trends in 
the real income of older persons as they age are also in 
general agreement with related findings of Hurd and Shoven 
(1982a), Barnes and Zedlewski (1981) and Bridges and 
Packard (1981). For a better understanding of the response 
of real income to inflation, specific income sources are ex 
amined in more detail. This analysis clearly indicates that 




Real Income for Families in the Retirement History Study 
by Year of Husband's Retirement
Real income3
Retire between 1969-71 ....
Retire between 1971-73 ....
Retire between 1973-75 ....





















SOURCE: Retirement History Study, 1969-75 interviews.
a. Values in 1967 dollars are measured by the consumer price index.
Earnings
Individuals develop lifecycle plans for time and resource 
allocation that generate anticipated age-earnings patterns. 
As persons age, they tend to reduce their labor supply either 
by entirely leaving the labor force or by working fewer 
hours. The declines in mean cohort earnings reported earlier 
are not unexpected and should not be considered mainly a 
response to inflation. However, unanticipated events such as 
unexpectedly high rates of inflation may cause persons to 
change their lifetime plans of work and retirement. These 
changes would occur in response to changes in the real wage 
rate and to shifts in the real value of wealth.
As long as real wages and real wealth are unchanged in 
response to inflation, older persons would likely not modify 
their work and retirement plans during periods of rising 
prices. The important issues are how inflation alters the real 
compensation package and wealth that a person expects. 
Clearly, the wage may change in late life even without price 
changes. The wage could be changing in response to 
economy-wide productivity gains, other macroeconomic
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conditions, individuals augmenting their skills, or persons 
suffering declines in their talents, perhaps because of health 
declines. Lifecycle models usually predict declining real 
wages during the final work years (Ghez and Decker 1975).
Various institutional arrangements such as labor contracts 
and equal opportunity laws may limit wage adjustments by 
hampering reductions in nominal wage rates while allowing 
real wage reductions. Inflation may permit some firms to 
lower real wages and encourage earlier retirement. Even if 
the cash wage rises at the same rate as prices, the total com 
pensation may fall because of the effect of inflation on the 
real value of fringe benefits. For example, the real value of 
initial pension benefits decline with rising prices if the benefit 
is determined using a salary averaging period (Clark and 
McDermed 1982).
Table 3 shows that the labor force participation rate for 
husbands fell from 79.4 to 25.2 percent between 1968-1974. 
For men in the labor force, average hours of work declined 
from 42.6 to 34.4 hours per week. Smaller declines occurred 
for wives in both of these measures of labor supply. These 
reductions in labor supply reflect declines in work with age 
and responses to inflation and other economic events.
Table 3 































SOURCE: Retirement History Study, 1969-75 interviews.
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During this period, average earnings for men declined by 
more than 57 percent, reflecting reduced market work. Earn 
ings of wives fell by 23 percent. These declines in nominal 
earnings occurred despite rising nominal wages. The average 
nominal wage of working men rose by one-third from $3.71 
in 1969 to $4.93 in 1975 and the mean nominal wage of 
working wives rose by 60 percent. However, the real wage of 
men fell by almost 10 percent and average real earnings 
dropped 70 percent. By contrast, the real wage of the wives, 
who are usually slightly younger than their husbands, rose by 
10 percent, but their real earnings fell because of reduced 
labor supply.
Social Security
Throughout the first three decades of the existence of the 
social security system, benefits were increased periodically 
by specific congressional action. The 1972 amendments pro 
vided for automatic indexing of benefits starting in 1975. 
Past earnings records were indexed to provide for rising real 
initial benefits. Both the indexing and the ad hoc changes 
have actually increased the real value of social security 
benefits for many retirees. For example, the benefits of a 
person retired in 1967 would have risen by 171 percent be 
tween 1968 and 1979. Since the CPI rose by 117.7 percent, 
real social security benefits have increased by approximately 
25 percent. Most of these real increases occurred between 
1968 and 1972, prior to the automatic adjustment of 
benefits. Since that time, benefits have risen in step with in 
creases in the CPI, and the real value of benefits has by and 
large remained constant. Nominal increases in benefits after 
retirement between 1968 and 1982 are shown in Table 4.
An examination of increases in social security benefits in 
the RHS sample indicates that real social security income 
was largely insulated from erosion by price increases. The ad
Table 4 
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SOURCE: Social Security Bulletin: Annual Statistical Supplement, 1977-79, p. 26 and recent issues of Social Security Bulletin. 
a. The values along a row indicate the Social Security benefit in each year as a percent of benefits in the year a person retired. For example, find 
the year of retirement on the left-hand column, say 1971. In 1974, the benefit for a person who retired in 1971 is 120 percent of the initial benefit 
received in 1971. These percentages represent the minimum percentage increase in primary insurance amounts.
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hoc increases in post-retirement benefits were sufficient to 
stabilize or increase real benefits during this decade. Initial 
benefits were rising more rapidly than the rate of inflation. 
These findings have important implications for the impact of 
inflation on the well-being of the elderly. First, this impor 
tant component of income of older persons has not declined 
with price increases. Since over 90 percent of persons 65 and 
over receive social security benefits, this is a significant 
observation. Second, low income persons rely more heavily 
on social security benefits since they tend not to have other 
forms of cash income. For example, the 1970 Survey of New 
ly Entitled Beneficiaries indicated that for the lowest income 
groups social security benefits accounted for over 80 percent 
of total cash income, but for high income groups, social 
security is less than 20 percent of income.
Initial benefits at retirement also have risen rapidly. Table 
5 illustrates the rise in initial benefits when average monthly 
earnings are held constant over time. Rising lifetime earnings 
of successive cohorts of retirees have produced additional 
gains in initial benefits because of higher average monthly 
earnings.
Pension Benefits
The real value of pension benefits during retirement is 
determined by the rate of inflation and the extent of any 
post-retirement benefit increases. One method of illustrating 
the effect of inflation on the real value of pension benefits is 
to calculate the expected wealth value of a constant benefit 
over a person's life. In this formulation, the value of the pen 
sion annuity is discounted by an interest rate and the prob 
ability of remaining alive to receive the benefit. For a 
60-year-old male retiree, a 7 percent annual rate of inflation 
lowers the discounted value of his pension wealth by 58 per 
cent (Clark and McDermed 1982).
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Table 5
Benefits for Persons Starting Payment at Age 65
in Various Years When Average Monthly Earnings






























































SOURCE: Derived from information in Social Security Bulletin: Annual Statistical Sup 
plement, 1977-79, pp. 15-19. 
a. Reached or exceeded the maximum level of PIA. 
b. Law was effective in June of the given year.
This illustration assumes that pension benefits are not in 
creased after a person retires and begins receiving benefits. 
Many pension plans, however, are increased in response to 
inflation, so benefits rise when the CPI increases. For exam 
ple, the Federal Civil Service Retirement system has been ful 
ly indexed since 1962 and many private plans provide ad hoc 
increases (King 1982). Alien, Clark and Sumner (1984) 
report that the average pension benefit for persons who 
retired before 1973 rose by 24 percent between 1973 and 
1979. This represented 40 percent of the CPI rise during the 
period. These increases were widespread, as 75 percent of all 
beneficiaries received at least one increase.
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Table 6 shows the mean real pension benefit of married 
men in the RHS between 1968 and 1974. The sample is divid 
ed by the survey year in which these men first are shown to 
be receiving benefits. For persons who were receiving 
benefits in 1968, the mean real 1974 benefit was only 3 per 
cent lower. Somewhat larger declines are observed for the 
groups that began to receive benefits in 1970 and 1972.
Table 6 




















SOURCE: Retirement History Study, 1969-75 interviews, 
a. Benefits are in 1967 dollars as measured by the consumer price index, 
b. The 1969 survey did not identify the proportion of family pension income in 1968 at 
tributable to the husband and wife. The 1968 figure represents our estimate based on ex 
amination of information in subsequent surveys and 1969 data on family members receiv 
ing pension benefits.
These declines seem surprisingly small, especially for those 
who have been retired the longest. This is due to the use of 
the mean as a summary statistic and the fact that some peo 
ple report large increases in pension benefits from one survey 
to the next. The pension income of these men may rise 
because firms have raised their benefits or because they begin 
to receive a second pension. The addition of a second benefit 
may substantially boost pension income and have a signifi 
cant effect on the sample mean. This possibility is shown in 
Table 7 by the fact that over 20 percent of the men have a 25 
percent or larger gain in real benefits between the year of in-
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itial benefits and 1974. Table 7 also shows that when the 
sample is divided at the mean of initial benefits, fewer per 
sons with initial benefits below the mean had a decline in the 
real value of their benefits. Further evidence that much of 
the gain in real pension income is due to the starting of a sec 
ond pension is the finding that almost 90 percent of persons 
with gains of 25 percent or more are persons who had pen 
sion income below the mean when they first started receiving 
benefits. Thus, it seems likely that these men began pensions 
from previous jobs as soon as they were eligible for benefits. 
These relatively low benefits were eventually supplemented 
by retirement income from more recent employment.
Table 7
Percent of Beneficiaries with Change in Pension Income 
Between Initial Year of Benefits and 1974
Any increase in 
nominal benefits .........
Loss in real benefits ........
Gain in real benefits ........
Above mean benefit 
Loss in real benefits ......
Gain in real benefits ......
Below mean benefit 
Loss in real benefits ......




























SOURCE: Retirement History Study, 1969-75 interviews.
These results are generally consistent with the findings of 
Thompson (1978) that the median pension benefit for com 
pletely retired pensioners in the RHS aged 63-64 rose from 
$1,980 in 1970 to $2,160 in 1974. This represents a fall in the
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real value of the benefits, since the CPI increased by 14 per 
cent and the nominal benefits rose by only 9 percent. The use 
of completely retired persons probably eliminates many per 
sons who acquired a second pension but continued employ 
ment. This restricting of the sample population reduces the 
variability of pension income over the period and reduces 
much of the gains in pension income.
Evidence on Real Incomes of Persons 65 and Older
In contrast to the cohort analysis that follows a specific 
group of individuals over time, this section uses aggregate 
data to indicate the rising real income of all persons 65 and 
older in each year. This analysis starts with a review of the 
trend in cash income and then extends the discussion to in 
clude the use of time and the value of in-kind benefits.
The median cash income, deflated by the CPI, of families 
whose head is aged 65 or older rose by almost 100 percent 
between 1950 and 1980. This rising real income of the elderly 
is own in Table 8. Compared to that of all families, the 
relative income of older families declined by 10 percent in the 
1950s, remained fairly stable during the 1960s and rose by 20 
percent during the 1970s. Because the median income of all 
families can be substantially affected by the age-composition 
of the population, the real income of older families is com 
pared in Table 8 with that of families whose head is age 
45-54. Heads of these families are in their peak earnings 
years, thus the ratio of the income of elderly families to that 
of families with heads aged 45-54 will be lower than when 
compared to the relative income of all families. Compared to 
the income of these middle-aged families, the relative income 
of older families fell by 13.4 percent during the 1950s and by 
6.7 percent in the 1960s before rising by 13.4 percent during 
the 1970s (see Table 9). During these decades, the consumer 
price index rose by 23.3 percent, 31.1 percent, and 112.4 per-
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cent, respectively. Thus, the loss in relative income was 
greatest when inflation was the lowest and there was a 
significant gain in relative income during the high-inflation 
decade of the 1970s. It could be argued that the rise in 
relative income of the elderly occurred because of the virtual 
cessation of real economic growth during the 1970s which 
stopped the growth in the real income of workers. By con 
trast, the real income of the elderly continued to rise with in 
creases in the real value of government transfers.
Table 8 
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SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, various years, 
a. Values derived by deflating nominal income by CPI, 1967= 100.
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Table 9 
Change in Real and Relative Income





























a. Percent change in last column of Table 8.
A further indication of the improving relative income of 
the elderly is the decline in the incidence of poverty among 
older Americans. Table 10 shows this decline along with the 
change in the poverty rate for the total population. The 
decline of poverty among the elderly has been much greater 
than among other groups, and in 1982 for the first time the 
poverty rate of the elderly was less than that for the popula 
tion at large.
The subsection on earnings showed that households also 
vary the way in which they allocate their time in order to in 
fluence their level of living. Instead of market work, time 
can be used to produce services consumed by the family. 
These services may be in the form of meal preparation, home 
repairs, leisure time, etc. Time at home is an important 
aspect of family well-being. The trends in cash income 
presented above do not include changes in time at home that 
would affect family well-being.
Age-specific labor force participation rates are one 
measure of the intensity of market work by a population 
group and hence are an indirect measure of time available 
for home activities. Table 11 shows that the participation
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rate for males aged 65 and over fell by over 50 percent be 
tween 1950 and 1980. Participation rates for older women 
have fallen slightly during this period. Thus, the rise in real 
income reported in Table 8 understates the increase in 
welfare because of significant increases in home time by the 
elderly. By contrast, the total work effort of persons 45-54 
increased during these three decades and the gains in income 
for them overstates the rise in their well-being.
Table 10 






























































































SOURCES: U.S. bureau of Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 127, 
"Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States: 1980" 
(Advance Data from the March 1981 Current Population Survey), GPO, Washington, 
1981, p. 29 and U.S. Bureau of Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 140, 
"Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States: 1982," 
GPO, Washington, 1983, p. 4.
101
Table 11 
Labor Force Participation Rates













































SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, various 
years.
Cash income also ignores the value of in-kind transfers 
received by older persons. Besides family and other private 
transfers, the federal government provides in-kind benefits 
in the form of health insurance and payment for medical ser 
vices, food stamps and other nutritional programs, housing 
assistance, and energy assistance. Most of these programs 
have been initiated and expanded during the last two 
decades. For example, medicare and medicaid were 
established by legislation in 1965 and Table 12 shows the 
significant increase in the real value of these benefits per 
older person during the 1970s. The combined real value of 
medicare and medicaid for the average older person rose 
from $324.25 in 1970 to $580.98 in 1981, or an increase of 79 
percent. Thus, the inclusion of medical in-kind benefits with 
cash income would result in an even greater rise in the real in 
come of the elderly during the 1970s than that indicated in 
Table 8. Other in-kind transfers have also increased in real 
value. For example, the real value of the subsidy for food 
stamps rose from $95.16 per older recipient in 1970 to 
$144.55 per older recipient in 1981.
102
Table 12
Real In-Kind Transfers of Medical Services 






















a. Values deflated by the medical component of the consumer price index, 1967= 100. 
b. Estimates for total medicaid expenditures for persons aged 65 and over are divided by 
population aged 65 and over. Expenditure estimates are from unpublished data from 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (1978); Cahfano (1978) and U.S. Congres 
sional Budget Office, 1982. Nominal values are deflated by the medical component of the 
consumer price index.
The Growth of Federal Transfer Programs 
to the Elderly
This section provides documentation of the role of federal 
transfers in the income of the elderly. During the past half 
century, the federal government has played an increasing 
role in the determination of the economic well-being of the 
elderly. The growth and development of cash and in-kind 
benefit programs has significantly altered the sources of in 
come for most older persons. Federal expenditures on the 
elderly include payments through retirement programs, old 
age survivors disability insurance (OASDI), health-care sub 
sidies, welfare programs, housing assistance and social ser 
vices. Table 13 lists the specific programs and the costs of 
transfers from these programs in fiscal 1982 (U.S. Congres 
sional Budget Office 1982; also see Califano 1978).
These federal expenditures have risen dramatically since 
the early 1960s because of legislative changes and growth in
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the older population. The number of people aged 65 and 
over has increased by 57.5 percent, from 16.7 million in 1960 
to 26.3 million in July 1981. Benefit programs to the elderly 
were $12.8 billion in 1960, whereas expenditures in 1982 
reached $196.2 billion, a fifteenfold increase. These figures 
do not include the value of preferential tax treatment given 
to the elderly.
Table 13
Estimated Federal Outlays for Persons 65 and Older
by Program, Fiscal Year 1982




Other federal retirement and survivor programs ....... 21.1
Medicaid........................................ 6.5
Veterans' benefits ................................ 4.3
Housing Assistance............................... 3.3
Supplemental Security Income ..................... 2.9
Other federal health programs...................... 2.3
Administration on Aging .......................... 0.7
Food stamps..................................... 0.6
Title XX Social Services ........................... 0.4
Energy Assistance ................................ 0.2
Other........................................... 2.4
Total......................................... 196.2
SOURCE: U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Work and Retirement: Options for Con 
tinued Employment of Older Workers, Washington: GPO, July 1982, p. 55.
Between 1960 and 1982, the CPI more than tripled. As a 
result, expenditures measured in 1967 dollars were $14.4 
billion in 1960, and real spending on these programs in 1982 
was five times the 1960 level. Thus, although two-thirds of 
the growth rate in annual spending on the elderly is due to 
price increases, there still has been a significant increase in
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the real resources allocated to these programs. The propor 
tion of the federal budget used to finance these programs 
rose from 13 percent in 1960 to 26.6 percent in 1982; the pro 
portion of the gross national product allocated to these 
benefit programs rose from 2.5 to 5.9 percent (Califano 
1978; Torrey 1982).
Another way to measure this growth is to note that the 
average benefit per person aged 65 and older increased from 
$768 in 1960 to $7,948 in 1982. If benefits had been increased 
only to reflect price increases, the average benefit would 
have been $2,516 in 1982; if benefits had risen in accordance 
with the growth in per capita disposable income, on the other 
hand, the transfer per elderly person would have been $3,663 
in 1982. This increase is the result of the introduction of new 
programs, higher benefits under existing programs and less 
restrictive eligibility conditions. Thus, much of the 
"graying" of the federal budget has occurred because of ex 
plicit policy changes by the federal government (Clark and 
Menefee 1981). One important change in federal policy has 
been the indexing of government programs to changes in 
consumer prices. Presently, 86 federal programs now have 
one or more provisions that increase in response to a rise in 
some index, usually a measure of prices or wages (U.S. Con 
gressional Research Service 1981). Indexing reduces the lag 
and uncertainty of increases caused by ad hoc adjustments.
The Relative Impact 
Imperfectly Anticipated Inflation
In addition to changes in real income, there are general ef 
fects of inflation on well-being that arise from its unpredict 
ability. Correctly anticipated inflation not entailing relative 
price changes causes people to hold less cash and make more 
frequent transactions, but these are relatively minor costs 
(Dornbusch and Fischer 1981; Gordon 1981). However, the
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rate of inflation is seldom fully anticipated and higher rates 
of inflation tend to be accompanied by more relative price 
variability and by more variability in the rate of inflation 
(Vining and Elwertowski 1976; Bordo 198]; Parks 1978; 
Cukierman 1979; Logue and Willett 1976). When incorrectly 
anticipated, an inflation factor is not built into market trans 
actions and institutions of an economy. This causes the basic 
losses in well-being and sense of unfairness that make infla 
tion so unpopular.
The elderly share in losses to the whole economy from not 
fully anticipated inflation, but they are not likely to suffer 
more, on average, than other groups. Two factors are in 
volved in their relative losses. First, any group that tends to 
be more mistaken in its inflation expectations would lose 
more. Given that the elderly have had more experience with 
economic and political change and have more time away 
from work to devote to market transactions, they may well 
do a better job of correctly anticipating inflation rates. Sec 
ond, any group that has higher costs of adjusting investment 
and consumption patterns to changes in relative prices im 
plied by inflation would lose more. The elderly are more like 
ly to be retired and thus potentially more mobile; they have 
more time away from jobs to be used for leisure and con 
sumption, so they may be more flexible in their buying and 
investment decisions. Thus, there is no presumption that the 
elderly suffer more or less from the welfare losses due to 
mistakes and adjustment costs than do others as the 
economy faces inflation.
Summary and Implications
Earlier sections of this paper have been devoted to examin 
ing the historical record of improving real income of the 
elderly, this analysis will be useful for current policymaking 
only if general and continuing relationships exist. The objec-
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tive of this final section is to assess the findings of this 
research for projecting the future status of the elderly.
The elderly tend to spend larger proportions of their in 
comes on food at home, medical care, and utilities than do 
younger families. Reasons for these differences include 
lower income for older families, more time at home, and 
declining health with age. These different spending patterns 
imply different sensitivities to relative price changes.
There is no theoretical reason to expect relative price 
changes of the 1970s to continue into the future. For exam 
ple, house prices rose rapidly during the 1970s but rose at a 
slower rate during the early 1980s. Also, food prices have 
risen more than the CPI in some years and less in others. The 
importance of relative price changes in determining changes 
in well-being should not be overlooked, but existing research 
on age-specific price indices suggests that price increases af 
fecting particular demographic groups do not deviate 
substantially from the increase for the general population. 
Recognizing substitution in consumption further moderates 
the effects of differences in relative price changes on the in 
crease in the price of the market basket actually purchased 
by different groups.
These basic concepts and review of recent price changes in 
dicate that relative price changes within a general inflation 
will have only minor effects on the well-being of the elderly 
compared to those for other demographic groups. Thus, the 
primary issue governing the effect of inflation on real in 
come of the elderly is the responsiveness of their incomes to 
rises in the general price level and costs imposed by im 
perfectly anticipated price changes.
Earnings are determined by the amount of labor supplied 
and the market wage rate. Although labor supply falls with 
age, earnings remain an important source of income for
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many older persons. Real wages rise with growth in produc 
tivity. There is no theoretical reason why growth in the real 
wage rate for older workers would deviate from this general 
pattern of wage growth in the economy. This source of in 
come should not cause changes in relative income between 
the elderly and the total population, and, in general, real 
wage growth will contribute to rising real income.
Social security retirement benefits and other governmental 
transfers have increased rapidly in real value during the past 
two decades. Since government transfers are now a major 
source of income for older persons, their responsiveness to 
price increases is an important determinant in the effect of 
inflation on real income. If the recent legislative patterns 
were to continue along with the existing indexation of pro 
grams, the trend in real income of the elderly established 
during the last two decades could be expected to continue. 
However, many demographic, economic and political fac 
tors are changing in ways that will limit the growth of 
transfer payments to the elderly.
Social security legislation passed in 1983 represented the 
culmination of years of debate concerning the long- and 
short-run financial crises the system was facing. This legisla 
tion provided for significant changes in the system and pro 
vided for a projected funding balance over the next 75 years. 
While the basic tenants of the program were left unchanged, 
the 1983 cost-of-living increase was delayed six months and 
full indexing in the future was made conditional on the 
relative size of wage and price increases. These changes 
slightly reduce the inflation protection guaranteed through 
this major source of income to the elderly.
The aging of the population, especially in the first 20 years 
of the next century, will require a major restructuring of the 
total income maintenance system for the elderly. Either taxes 
must be raised substantially, benefits must be lowered or
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funds diverted from other national priorities. The 1983 
social security legislation attempted to address this long-run 
problem by raising the age of eligibility for full benefits to 67 
in the next century. In addition, medicare must be 
reevaluated to prevent rapidly rising costs from producing 
large deficits; in the coming decades other transfers likely 
will be affected by this demographic pressure which may 
limit their future growth.
The increase in real benefits for older persons was 
stimulated in large measure by the belief that many older 
persons were destitute and private methods would not pro 
vide the necessary transfers. The rise in real and relative in 
come of the elderly, along with a sharp decline in the in 
cidence of poverty, has reduced or eliminated some of the 
pressures for major new programs or increases in real 
benefits for the elderly in general. Recent budgetary in 
itiatives have reduced benefits and tightened eligibility condi 
tions for medicaid, food stamps, and other welfare programs 
that provide benefits to some older persons. Social security 
and medicare benefits have also been altered during the early 
1980s.
The trend toward indexation of these benefit programs is 
attributable to the still commonly held view that the elderly 
live on fixed incomes. The full and perhaps over indexation 
of benefits during the past decade when real wages were fall 
ing has sharply challenged this belief. As a result, the indexa 
tion of social security, government pensions, and other 
transfers has been critically examined and numerous pro 
posals for their reductions have been made. Changes in the 
methods of indexing federal pensions and food stamps have 
already been enacted and further modification of other in 
dexing provisions seems likely during the 1980s.
High rates of inflation may cause financial institutions to 
be altered so that future payments reflect price changes. For
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the elderly, one of the most important of these institutions is 
the employer pension system. Available evidence indicates 
that real pension benefits after retirement have declined with 
inflation. This is despite the fact that many firms provide ad 
hoc increases. A more formal adjustment mechanism would 
seem likely if high rates of inflation were to continue for 
another decade.
Real income from assets depends on changes in the relative 
rate of return to the items in an individual's investment port 
folio. Rates of return fluctuate over time, with price changes 
in houses, gold, diamonds, and stocks being recent ex 
amples. Wealth allocation decisions of the elderly will be 
based on expected future inflation rates and real rates of 
return to their assets. In such a framework, the expected ef 
fects of inflation on the real wealth of the elderly should not 
differ greatly from its effects on the rest of the population.
Older persons also consume from their stock of durable 
goods. These goods include the family car, home, furniture, 
applicances, etc. The nominal value of consumption rises as 
the replacement costs of these durables rise. The real value of 
consumption from durable goods should be unaffected by 
price increases and since the elderly often have a relatively 
large stock of durables, the "indexation" of this income 
source is important.
This summary indicates that most sources of income of the 
elderly rise in response to increasing prices. There is no fun 
damental reason to expect real earnings or return to assets to 
fall with inflation. Most government transfer programs are 
currently indexed to reflect price increases automatically. 
However, policy changes in the next few years may alter 
these provisions. Nominal pension benefits have been in 
creased, but, in general, these increases lag behind price 
changes; however, future institutional changes may 
moderate this effect. Thus, income from private sources is 
not fixed.
110
Our analysis shows that currently it is not true that the 
elderly live on fixed incomes and are, therefore, more 
vulnerable to inflation than the total population. This is 
especially true for low-income older persons who receive 
almost all of their income from public sources. Did the elder 
ly ever live on fixed incomes? This question is beyond the 
scope of this paper; however, several issues are relevant. 
Prior to World War II, over half the men aged 65 and over 
remained in the labor force and thus had earnings that rose 
along with those of other workers. Many lived on farms and 
retained control of the extended family's resources. 
Transfers from the family may have been replaced by 
government transfers during the past several decades.
In the future, the effect of inflation on the real income of 
the elderly will depend on private responses and government 
changes. Will children increase their support for their aged 
parents? Will individuals alter their lifecycle savings plans to 
provide increased wealth for old age? Will the trend toward 
early retirement be reversed? Will changes in political and 
economic climate lead to a reversal of existing inflation pro 
tection of the income of the elderly? Answers to these ques 
tions will determine the future level of income and the effects 
of inflation on the well-being of the elderly.
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If there is an article of faith among gerontologists, it is 
that chronological age is irrelevant. Over and over again, we 
are told that some persons are ready for retirement in their 
30s and 40s, while others are responsible for great 
philosophical or scientific achievements well into their eighth 
and ninth decade of life.
Examples of age and creativity are cited in the column by 
Cyril F. Brickfield, executive director of the Association of 
Retired Persons. 1 Jessica Tandy at age 74 opened trium 
phantly on Broadway in the demanding role of Amanda 
Winfield in the revival of Tennessee Williams' "Glass 
Menagerie." Her performance was widely acclaimed by the 
drama critics. Just down the street, Rex Harrison, at age 75, 
opened successfully in the revival of "Heartbreak House" 
by George Bernard Shaw, who continued to write plays until 
late in life.
The same evidence is clear from last year's Nobel Prize 
awards. At age 81 Barbara McClintock won the Nobel for 
medicine while Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar, 73, and 
William Fowler, 72, shared the prize for physics.
Other examples abound. Benjamin Franklin invented 
bifocals at age 78; Giovanni Colle at age 70 provided the first
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definitive description of blood transfusion and Benjamin 
Duggar discovered a life-saving antibiotic at age 76. 
Brickfield concludes that creativity can occur at any age, 
even at advanced ages, and creativity in old age is not found 
only among the rare individuals who are famous.
The absurdity of the compulsory retirement age is 
dramatized neatly in a letter from Bernard L. Baer in the 
New York Times, February 19, 1984. At age 73 Baer volun 
tarily retired and after a year of frustrating idleness began to 
look for jobs. He maintains he was 100 percent able mentally 
and physically but was consistently and regretfully turned 
down because of age. His background was in sales promo 
tion, advertising and management. In desperation, he revis 
ed he vita, simply lying by taking 11 years off his age. Within 
two months he had a job.
Seven years later, even though he claimed he received 
merit increases and additional responsibilities every year, he 
was mandatorily retired at age 70. He was actually 81 at the 
time and as able physically and mentally as when he retired, 
according to his own version of events. This is one illustra 
tion of how ridiculous mandatory retirement can be. He 
notes, as many others have, "some people become incapable 
in their 70s, 50s, 40s and 30s; many retain the capability 
beyond their 70s. They should be appraised accordingly and 
not automatically dispensed with."
I do not challenge this precept. Personal observation con 
firms that some people of rather tender age would be happier 
retired or at least not working in their current occupations. 
But I cite one fundamental advantage of chronological 
age—that is its definitiveness. All one needs to prove age is a 
birth certificate, but once we discard the criterion of a 
chronological age, we must seek substitutes. If there are dif 
ferences among people in terms of ability and performance 
on the job, how does one begin to think about measuring
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them? Once we forget the number of years one has spent in 
this world, we must move on to less definite criteria to judge 
ability to do the job at hand.
As it turns out, this is the mirror image of the problem that 
those of us who have been interested in the economics of 
disability have been struggling with for years. To distinguish 
among those persons in the population who should be 
classified as disabled and those who should not, to determine 
who is qualified to receive a transfer payment because of a 
disabling condition and who is not, is a very old problem. In 
the disability case, the quest is for a measure of physical and 
mental functional limitations; in the retirement case, it is a 
search for measures of performance which probably depend 
on residual functional capacities.
In this paper we examine the disability experience to show 
how difficult the problem of determining disability status 
has been. Nothing in the disability experience provides any 
aid or comfort to those who allege that we should eliminate 
compulsory retirement and judge persons by their ability to 
do the job.
We first look briefly at the improvements in longevity 
which are the reasons for the problem receiving so much re 
cent attention. Scholars disagree as to whether the declines in 
mortality are associated with improvements or declines in 
health status. We discuss that controversy and conclude that 
if our interest is in work ability, then it is something more 
than health that we must be concerned with. It is not even 
"active life expectancy," but the decision to participate or 
not participate in the labor force.
We examine the disability record from ancient days to pre 
sent to show how difficult disability determination decisions 
have been. Even where sophisticated models seek to include 
all relevant variables, it is the health measures which prove to 
be most elusive. Examination of that experience leads us to
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advice caution in eliminating employers' freedom to retire 
persons after a certain age.
Improvement in Longevity
What seems to be undisputed is the improvement in mor 
tality rates in this century. 2 The greatest relative improve 
ment has occurred at the young ages, resulting largely from 
the control of infectious diseases. The probability of death at 
age 0 decreased 90 percent between 1900 and 1980, but look 
what has happened to those who survived to age 65. At age 
65 the probability of death decreased 30 percent from 1900 
to 1980 for males and 61 percent for females, a gap I expect 
to see narrowed as women become increasingly subject to the 
same pressures and hazards as men. In the meantime, those 
males lucky enough to survive can look forward to this un 
balanced relationship among the sexes.
We are dealing with a relatively new phenomenon. Life ex 
pectancy at age 65 increased very little from 1900 to 1930, 
but since that time there have been rapid gains in life expec 
tancy at age 65 that have occurred for both males and 
females, though again the females having the greater gains.
Incidentally, in spite of these improvements in mortality 
rates, we should expect a decline in the net annual increase in 
the number of social security beneficiaries at the turn of the 
century. The low fertility rates during the 1930s will be 
reflected in a considerable reduction in the rate of increase in 
the population over 65 during the 1990s in spite of any im 
provements in the mortality rate. This will come about just 
at the time when the baby boom generation born after World 
War II will be swelling the labor force.
After 2015, the growth in the labor force is expected to 
slow down reflecting the decline of fertility rates which 
began in the mid 60s. It is then that we expect social security
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financing problems, which can be alleviated if workers retire 
later.
Improvements or Declines in Health
There come now the controversial issues. Alicia Munnell 
forecasts that tomorrow's elderly will have improved life ex 
pectancy, better health, and more education than those retir 
ing today. 3 On two of these accounts, there can be no 
faulting Ms. Munnell—improved life expectancy and more 
education. The question of better health is one that is in 
question.
In sharp contrast to Munnell's position is that taken by 
James H. Schulz who believes that increased longevity does 
not necessarily mean more surviving older persons will be 
able to work. He emphasizes the many health factors that 
operate to reduce mortaility may also reduce the 
employability of older persons. Examples include: improved 
survival from myocardial infarctions among the disabled; 
the persistence of the incidence of arthritis or any of a 
number other disabling conditions that do not generally 
cause death; successful treatment of individuals with prob 
lems such as diabetes that previously would cause early 
deaths but that are still disabling, and alcohol or drug 
abuse. 4
This discrepancy in the viewpoints of these two eminent 
scholars has been pointed out by Michael Taussig in his 
discussion of the two papers and it is Taussig who notes that 
pension policy decisions depend critically on who is right.
"We expect that continued improvements in 
medical care and technology will—in the absence of 
nuclear war or some other catastrophe of com 
parable magnitude—cause a large increase in the 
number of persons who survive until, and well past,
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the traditional retirement ages in this country. We 
do not yet know, however, whether the expected in 
crease in longevity will cause a corresponding in 
crease in the number of dependent aged persons. If 
the aged workers of tomorrow is healthier than 
either his or her counterpart today, and if there are 
sufficient attractive job opportunities, then increas 
ed longevity will not necessarily mean increased 
dependency." 5
The same controversy runs through the early reports of the 
National Commission on Social Security, as Jacob J. 
Feldman has pointed out. In the March 1981 report, the ma 
jority position was that increased longevity will be accom 
panied by a corresponding increase in active life. Also, that 
periods of diminished vigor associated with aging will 
decrease so that the chronic disease will occupy a smaller 
proportion of the typical life span. Yet a minority of the 
Commission contended that the evidence does not support 
any claim that longer life is equivalent to longer years of 
good health. Feldman notes that the current state of 
knowledge does not permit a definitive resolution of that 
controversy. 6
Noting the dramatic decline in death rates, Feldman asks 
whether that decline among persons 50 to 69 years of age is 
tantamount to improved health and working capacity. He 
notes first of all some short term trends. Using data from the 
National Health Interview Survey, he notes that 21.9 percent 
of men aged 65 to 69 answered that they had activity limita 
tions that prevented them from working in 1970 a percentage 
that increased to 24.9 in 1975 and 25.2 in 1980.
Even greater differences are to be found among the other 
age groups in the 50 to 54, 55 to 58 and 60 to 64 ages. This in 
crease took place during a period of rapid decline in death 
rates for men in these age groups. Some suggestive data
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Feldman cites indicate that if we go back further, the 
disability or activities limitation rate for men age 55 to 64 
was about 10 percent in 1949 and even lower in 1935.
As Feldman notes, morbidity is difficult to quantify as op 
posed to the relative ease of measuring mortality. Social 
security actuaries rationalize their ignoring morbidity rates 
on the grounds that mortality and morbidity are correlated; 
when mortality improves, morbidity also tends to improve. 7 
Feldman disagrees. He believes that a decline in mortality 
rates can be connected with an increase in morbidity rates. 
Life-threatening conditions are not the same as disabling 
conditions. While there is obviously some overlap, a great 
deal of disability is caused by conditions that are not lethal. 
Musculoskeletal conditions are the cause of a large propor 
tion of work disability. Arthritis, for instance, does not ap 
pear to shorten one's life span to any great extent. In his 
view, there is no reason why reductions in mortality rates 
should result in a reduction in the prevalence of arthritis or 
any of a number of other disabling conditions that are 
generally not lethal.
Active Life Expectancy
Since there is sharp disagreement about whether mortality 
and morbidity are closely correlated, it is necessary to have 
something other than improvements in mortality rates if we 
are to have confidence in estimates of the future labor supply 
of older workers. The problem has been addressed by a 
Massachusetts research team headed by Dr. Sidney Katz who 
developed a concept of "active life expectancy." They use 
life tables techniques to analyze the expected remaining years 
of functional well-being for their sample of noninstitu- 
tionalized elderly people living in Massachusetts in 1974. 
Waves of these people were interviewed at periodic intervals. 
They found that the expected years of active life expectancy 
range from 10 years for those 65 to 70 years to 2.9 years for
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those 85 years or older. Active life expectancy is shorter for 
the poor than others and women had a longer average dura 
tion of expected dependency than men. 8
It is a clever idea to construct life tables, not in terms of 
expected date of death, but expected date of incapacity; the 
contrast is between active versus inactive life. But the dif 
ficulty is that the contrast is too sharp, the division too 
abrupt. Scales of activities of daily living measure too much. 
The scales measure six basic functions; bathing, dressing, go 
ing to the bathroom, transfer, continence and eating. These 
are essential biological functions.
If, however, interest is in whether people are ready to go to 
work or not go to work, then it is obvious that some persons 
who may score quite high on these activities of daily living 
scales are still not necessarily able to jump into the labor 
market. Measuring limitations of persons based on essential 
biological functions is to move just one step from the mor 
tality scales themselves.
Health, Labor Supply and Survey
One of the problems noted by Newquist and Robinson9 is 
that health data, especially for the older population, has 
been gathered for purposes other than employment policy 
analysis. The problem is that the investigators discuss the 
problem in terms of morbidity factors, or in terms of ac 
tivities of daily living and these are clearly inappropriate. 
What is necessary is to get some concept of health which is 
applicable to the work decision and, at the same time, to 
recognize that health is only one of the factors that will af 
fect whether older persons are going to be active participants 
in the job market. In short, what we are dealing with here is a 
complex labor supply issue, complicated by this notion of 
what constitutes health and what does not constitute health 
and how one can measure it.
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This is a relatively old problem. It arises in theoretical and 
empirical models of labor supply as researchers attempt to 
include a health variable. The problem is present in surveys 
which attempt to examine the number and characteristics of 
disabled persons in the population. It has been a leading 
problem for years in all of the programs designed to compen 
sate persons who have disabling conditions. These include 
tort cases where juries set indemnity payments according to 
disability status, workers' compensation programs, and of 
course, the Social Security Disability Insurance program.
The Ancient Origins of the Problem
The notion of compensation for injuries can be traced 
back to the code of Hammurabi (1945-1902 B.C.). The 
essential advance in Hammurabi's code was the partial 
substitution of "compensation" to replace "retaliation." 10
One clear illustration of how compensation replaced 
retaliation is found in Exodus, Chapter 21, verses 18 and 19:
18. And if men contend, and one smite the other 
with a stone, or with his fists, and he die not, but 
keep his bed;
19. If he rise again and walk abroad upon his staff, 
then shall he that smote him be quit; only he shall 
pay for the loss of his time and shall cause him to 
be thoroughly healed.
The commentaries explain that compensation is awarded 
on five grounds for damage, for pain, for healing, for loss of 
time and for insult. (Insult apparently refers to payments 
made when the harm was intentionally inflicted.) Liability 
for healing extended to payment of medical costs. The com 
mentaries are quite specific as to when liability ceases and 
under what conditions the case may be reopened, to use the 
modern phrase.
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The commentaries speak of payment for damages in what 
appears to be strikingly modern terms. The idea was to look 
at the injured person, to appraise his worth before the in 
jury, and to contrast it with what he would be worth with the 
impairment. In a perfect market, the difference would be the 
present value of the future net product of the whole person 
as contrasted with the impaired one. Of course, in those 
days, there were examples at hand with slave markets, and 
these capitalized values could be observed. They did not have 
to be estimated by probabilistic functions dependent on im 
perfect knowledge of future earnings streams.
The ancient examples permit us to look at several facets of 
disability. In ancient codes and in modern day workers' com 
pensation, disability is often equated with a loss of limb, loss 
of an eye, or loss of hearing. Such losses are, of course, per 
manent. For purposes of both labor market analysis and 
disability analysis, it is permanent, chronic or long term, not 
short term, phenomena or acute illness, that is relevant. The 
permanent aspects are rather gruesomely exemplified by am 
putation, which is not only long term but quite permanent.
Another dimension that has to be focused on is the con 
cept of partial versus total disability and it is obvious, even in 
ancient days, that a man could sustain rather extensive 
physical damage and still participate to some extent in work. 
Thus a persons is not either disabled or not disabled, but 
there are various degrees of disability. The extent of disabili 
ty becomes particularly important when trying to assess the 
labor force chances of older persons.
Workers' Compensation Experience
Soon after workers' compensation was itnroduced in this 
country, beginning in 1911, the state laws provided for 
schedules derived from experience with private insurance 
carriers and from some of the European laws. Schedules
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soon became hallmarks of compensation statutes. Essential 
ly, these provided for a price, possibly the number of weeks 
of compensation that was to be paid, for specified losses. 
They detailed the prices of parts of the body. If a person lost 
a finger, toe, or wrist and arm, the amounts of compensation 
due him would be listed in the schedule, thereby minimizing 
administrative discretion.
Eminent legal scholars argue about the nature of the 
system. Larson believes it was a matter of operationalizing a 
wage-loss system appropriate to large scale mass social in 
surance programs." In effect, the schedules provided a way 
to proxy the wage loss suffered by some average person with 
these particular losses. Whatever the intellectual and 
theoretical justification, the schedules never lived up to their 
promise. The trouble was that persons simply did not always 
lose limbs at the particular joints specified in the schedule. 
More important, if the law that is going to compensate a per 
son for loss of an arm triggers a particular amount of com 
pensation, why not pay an equal amount for the loss of use 
of that arm? But once you consider loss of use and injuries to 
parts of the body not specified on the schedule, such as the 
back or head, you are into an area where discretion has to be 
used, thus defeating the purpose of the schedules.
The point to be made is that there are difficulties involved 
in assessing the amount of disability payments due a person 
with a particular type of work injury. The problem has been 
recognized for years and years under our workers' compen 
sation statutes.
In workers' compensation, the worker alleges either that 
he cannot now work at all, or that he cannot now work at the 
level of energy or capacity that he could prior to his injury, 
or that his injury has left him in a condition that will in 
terfere with his future ability to perform tasks in the same 
manner and method as he could have, had he not incurred
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that injury. The workers' compensation commissions 
therefore have the task of deciding whether there has been 
any such interference with the work potentiality of the in 
dividual and if so, how that deficiency can be measured. As 
noted above this is the mirror image of the problem faced by 
the aged. In the retirement case, it is the worker who alleges 
that his ability to work at his task, in the same degree of effi 
ciency and manner as before, has not been impaired. The 
employer who advocates retirement of the worker, alleges 
otherwise. Consequently, the question arises as to the ap 
propriate tests of limitation or residual capacity.
In workers' compensation where the schedules are not ap 
propriate (the vast majority of cases in most states), the com 
missions have developed several different theories to deter 
mine payment.
In some jurisdictions, payments will be made if the worker 
can demonstrate specific physical or mental impairment. 
Other states will not pay unless the worker can demonstrate 
actual wage loss. Jurisdictions in between, as it were, at 
tempt to evaluate a worker's loss of wage-earning capacity.
In any event, each of these methods has its distinct limita 
tions. Physical impairment is difficult to measure and more 
difficult to translate into compensation payments. It is one 
thing to be able to evaluate physical losses and another to be 
able to price these losses in some way that is meaningful in 
the labor market.
When it comes to wage loss, a method that is now being 
widely touted because of its recent adoption in the State of 
Florida, there are obvious difficulties. Michigan, for many 
years, had a wage-loss system in workers' compensation, but 
unfortunately, the complexities of the system, the institu 
tional arrangements, or other factors resulted in most cases 
ending up in compromise and release settlements. 12 So, 
although Michigan technically had a wage-loss system, it was
125
to all intents and purposes really a bargaining system based 
on a workers' physical condition.
Michigan also had a problem which was unique among the 
states. Many workers who retired from automobile plants 
simultaneously filed workers' compensation claims. The so- 
called retirement problem exposed, in raw relief, the essen 
tial issue with which we are concerned. To what extent are 
workers who formally retired realistically in the labor 
market? Interestingly enough, in the Michigan cases, the 
claim was that the retirement status did not bar access to the 
labor market, rather it was alleged that some physical condi 
tion incurred during working life prevented working at the 
wages that otherwise would have been earned. The terrible 
complexities of that situation again argue for a certain ar 
bitrariness in defining an age of retirement, no matter how 
inequitable this may be to particular individuals.
It seems to be quite clear that no workers' compensation 
program had the lock on a perfect solution to its problems. 
All that can be said is that some states that actively interven 
ed in the administration process and combined rehabilitation 
techniques with its administration of benefits were more suc 
cessful than others who depended on purely legal ad 
ministrative methods.
Social Security Disability Insurance
The problems of workers' compensation were well known 
to the framers of our national Society Security Disability In 
surance Act. 13 Although it was thought that disability in 
surance would come on stream early in the history of social 
security, as a matter of fact the federal government entered 
the field with the disability freeze in the 1950s and it was not 
until 1960 that we began a full-fledged disability insurance 
program.
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Two of the pitfalls were neatly eliminated in the disability 
insurance program of social security. One was the decision 
not to pay any permanent partial benefits. Either a worker 
was to be considered disabled or not disabled. This decision 
created a host of problems even as it solved others. There 
was no easy way to dispose of doubtful cases. The other 
problem eliminated was the confusion over retirement and 
disability. Workers could collect disability insurance only up 
to the age of 64. At age 65 they would receive social security 
retirement benefits. No one over the age of 65 was eligible to 
receive disability insurance benefits on their own account.
The definition of disability under the Act was the inability 
to engage in substantial gainful activity that is due to a 
physical or mental impairment that is expected to last at least 
12 months. To be considered disabled under this rather strin 
gent definition, a person has to be unable to perform any 
work which he is reasonably qualified to perform, anywhere 
in the economy. It was not a test that depended on the ability 
to perform th duties of one's job, or even one's occupation.
Although all workers age 50 and over were entitled to col 
lect disability insurance payments as early as 1956, it was not 
until 1960 that the program became a general one for all 
covered workers below age 65. Thus we have not yet seen a 
full generation of workers who are covered by the Social 
Security Act disability provisions pass through their working 
lives.
By 1970 we were paying out about $2.7 billion a year in 
disability insurance benefits, an amount that increased to 
$7.6 billion by 1975, a 175 percent increase. The increases in 
the program continued between 1975 and 1976, reaching 
$11.1 billion in 1977. Although payments have not peaked, 
the number of beneficiaries did at about that year, and since 
then, the increases in payments have been modest, ranging 
about 9 to 10 percent each year in payments as wage levels
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have escalated. All told, from 1970 to 1980, there has been a 
436 percent increase in disability insurance payments.
Although the decline in the numbers of beneficiaries began 
to come as early as 1977, the public consciousness of this 
decline did not surface until a good bit later. It was the 1980 
amendments to the Act which tightened the administrative 
regulations as to who should or who should not receive 
benefits. More important, they provided for a review of 
these benefits and it is the administration of this review 
which has created a great deal of public concern over the last 
several years, especially for those persons with mental ill 
nesses.
The problem is a familiar one and it is exactly the same 
problem that we have had in workers' compensation and in 
every disability program. How does one tell whether one is 
disabled; under what conditions does one buy this ticket out 
of the labor force? Bear in mind that the pressure to increase 
retirement ages and to stay in the labor force has been 
matched by this pressure for certain people to get out via the 
disability benefits.
The problem has been that the criteria actually used de 
pend a great deal on the showing of some severe medical im 
pairment. Probably 80 percent of the awards are made to ap 
plicants who have one or more impairments equivalent to 
those listed in the federal regulations. It is only for people 
who do not meet these so-called "medical listings" that con 
sideration is given other factors such as the person's training, 
education and experience.
This possibility excessive reliance on medical conditions 
ignores the fact that there is a large gap between medical con 
dition, on the one hand, and the withdrawal from the labor 
force which is the prerequisite for disability benefits, on the 
other.
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Not Medical Condition Alone
My reasons for emphasizing this difference comes from 
two sources, one sociological and one economic. The 
sociologists, largely influenced by Saad Nagi and others, 14 
have emphasized the differences between medical condition, 
impairment, functional limitation, and the resulting disabili 
ty. They recognize that a medical diagnosis based upon 
symptoms and signs and classified largely according to body 
systems, is useful to the physician interested in cure, but 
possibly irrelevant to the problem of work, in part because 
of the large differences in the extent of severity of any condi 
tion.
The issue is whether or not that medical condition leads to 
an impairment, the enervation of a nerve or the loss of a limb 
to take an extreme case. From there, we need to know 
whether or not that impairment results in any functional 
limitation. We are thinking of such things as ability to lift, to 
carry, to stoop, to bend, to walk, or in the case of mental im 
pairments, the equivalent of functional limitations which 
may be the ability to relate to others or to tolerate the stresses 
of a normal job. I will return to that problem of getting the 
equivalent of functional limitations in mental illnesses in a 
moment.
From an economic point of view, it is essential that we 
have some measure of functional limitations as a health 
variable in an attempt to explain whether or not people with 
disabilities choose or do not choose to participate in the 
labor force. What the framers of the disability insurance law 
and, for that matter, workers' compensation laws never 
recognized explicitly, but always recognized implicitly, is 
that there are disincentive effects to these benefits. These 
disincentive effects are related to the generosity and the 
leniency of the disability transfers generally. The matter is 
well put by Barbara L. Wolfe:
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The older disabled person's work/retirement 
choice depends on potential earnings in the labor 
market, the availability and generosity of 
disability-related transfers and other income sup 
port programs and the disability status of the in 
dividual. Disability status reflects limitations of 
physical, mental or emotional sort which reduce the 
worker's ability to perform the required functions 
of jobs which he is on other grounds qualified to 
hold. It is a concept that links impairment with the 
requirements of specific jobs. 15
The work that as been done thus far attempts to measure 
the income and substitution elasticities associated with 
changes in net wage rates on unearned income generated by 
income transfers. Several studies have attempted to look at 
this problem. 16 Wolfe points out the problem with these 
studies, including their choice of the variable to represent 
health is that some of them do not capture severity, duration 
or the relation of functional limitations to past or available 
occupations. There are other problems relating to the 
measurement of availability of disability-related transfers 
and the fact that some of these leave out labor demand 
variables and include only a few labor supply variables.
Some of the problems with the so-called first generation 
studies have been remedied in the second generations of 
these studies. 17 Each of the later studies is a fairly 
sophisticated work-choice model, and each of them has dif 
ficulties in dealing with so-called true health status of the 
employee.
Parsons, as Wolfe points out, uses subsequent mortality as 
his health status measure. But as we have discussed above, 
there is a great deal of controversy about the relationship 
between mortality and morbidity. Wolfe also points out that 
Leonard's disability status indicator consists of 27 specific
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health problems, diseases, conditions and infirmities. It 
poses a number of difficulties. It gives no indication of 
severity, it gives no indication of degree of functional limita 
tions and it is not linked to job requirements.
Slade's disability measure indicates whether or not the in 
dividual reports that he or she is limited in getting around. 
This simple self-reported status has a number of problems. 
Wolfe notes that since it is measured contemporaneously 
with labor force participation, it may reflect the individual's 
taste for work and, hence, it may be endogenous to the 
model.
The Haveman and Wolfe disability measures are self- 
reported measures and while they convey duration and inten 
sity, they are very general and may be subject to the charge 
that they allow the legitimization of failure. Persons who are 
unsuccessful at work may be motivated to define themselves 
as permanently sick in order to legitimize their self-defined 
failure. All of these measures capture only some limited 
dimensions of the relevant concept of disability.
Functional Limitations Again
What is needed for purposes of econometric surveys, for 
the various transfer payment programs, and I believe for the 
retirement decisions for aged persons, is a better measure of 
functional limitations.
The search for these measures has been going on for some 
time. The American Medical Association, as far back as 
1971, under the guidance of a committee chaired by Dr. 
Henry Kessler, issued the Guides to the Evaluation of Per 
manent Impairment. 18 Here we have a detailed look at essen 
tially physical impairment or functional limitation measures. 
Such measures required a physical examination to deter 
mine, for example, the extent of flexion of the extremities. 
The Guides specify the exact percentage of disability that
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ought to be assigned for particular conditions. This is a 
heroic attempt to deal not only with the extremities but to 
deal with the evaluation of permanent impairment of backs, 
heart disease and a number of other types of condition which 
would not ordinarily be thought of as being scheduled.
We also have to note the attempt by the Social Security 
Administration in its survey to deal with measures of func 
tional limitations by self-reported responses. These obvious 
ly do not go far enough. It should be possible to develop 
these scales so as to give us some clue as to whether or not a 
person is capable of working, insofar as his health is con 
cerned.
We think a promising beginning is made in the so-called 
functional assessment inventories developed by the Universi 
ty of Minnesota. We are currently engaged in a research pro 
ject where we are trying to test these as measures of func 
tional limitation in a vocational rehabilitation program. 19
What all this boils down to is that the same issues that 
arise as we deal with disability can crop up as we seek to 
measure ability. If one wishes to eliminate compulsory retire 
ment age, residual functional capacity measures become im 
portant. We have to get down to looking not at a medical 
condition classification or even impairments, but rather 
whether or not a person is able to carry out the physical and 
mental functions required by the job or by any job. In this 
regard, there is no doubt that the area we know least about 
has to do with mental impairments. That evaluating mental 
impairments and the residual functioning capacity is a 
troublesome problem is nowhere more apparent than in the 
Disability Insurance program. Most of the controversy has 
arisen in this area as more and more persons have been 
denied benefits in this review process which began in 1981.
Over 900,000 beneficiaries were evaluated as to their 
eligibility status and almost 400,000 of these lost benefits as a
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result of these investigations. A disproportionate amount of 
those who lost benefits were persons with mental im 
pairments of one sort or another. Conceptually, we are just 
beginning to understand what the equivalent of physical 
limitation or functional capacity for mental impairment is. It 
is obviously necessary that we consider such things as carry 
ing out and remembering instructions, responding ap 
propriately to supervision and coworkers and reacting to 
customary work pressures in a routine work setting.
Measuring Ability of Older Workers 
and Retirement Issues
Ability or inability to work because of a mental or physical 
impairment is difficult to determine, but however the issue is 
decided, we know that examination of that person's medical 
condition is not enough. It is not the medical condition, but 
the consequences of that condition—how that condition af 
fects an individual human being's mental and physical func 
tioning that counts, and even that is not enough. We must 
look at how the limitations or residual functioning capacity 
interacts with a host of other factors to determine that per 
son's labor market chances.
These complex considerations are the same whether we are 
considering the injured worker fighting to retain his job, 
another worker doing his best to maximize his disabling con 
ditions so as to leave the labor force, the older worker who is 
seeking to retain his position or the employer seeking to 
retire him at age 65.
The dispute that rages over whether improvements in 
longevity will mean an increase in healthier workers fighting 
to stay in the labor force or an increase in impaired older per 
sons who will become dependent on the working population 
probably centers around the wrong issues. Here again, it is 
not simply a question of possible changes in morbidity levels
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of older workers. Their health must be considered together 
with such factors as their education, their training, the con 
dition of the labor market and the levels of social insurance 
benefits. Does that mean that health is not important? No, 
but it is their physical and mental functioning, not their 
medical conditon, that is going to be the important health 
variable to be considered.
Are we serious about wanting to encourage the participation 
of older workers in the labor force? Are we serious about 
eliminating compulsory retirement age? If we are, it calls for 
action on all fronts, not merely passing legislation which im 
poses costs without assurances of corresponding benefits. 
We will have to think not only about education and training 
programs but retraining programs as workers progress 
through their life cycles. If we are going to live in a rapidly 
changing high technology economy, and if we want to have 
workers equipped to deal with its problems, it is obvious that 
one injection of education which concludes at age 22 or 23 is 
not sufficient to carry workers over the next four, let along 
five or six decades of life.
It is just as obvious that our retirement policy is affected 
by levels of social insurance benefits and particularly by how 
we penalize workers who retire early or reward them for 
staying past the normal retirement age. The 1983 amend 
ments to the Social Security Act will increase normal retire 
ment age to 67 by 1990 and increase the benefits for workers 
staying past their normal retirement age.
Bear in mind that the argument for abolition of com 
pulsory retirement centers around the notion that 
chronological age is irrelevant. That sword cuts both ways. 
Some older people are competent past the age of retirement 
and some younger people are incompetent prior to the age of 
retirement. Eliminating the compulsory retirement age 
means that we have to get serious about tests of performance
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for younger workers, and to the extent that health is impor 
tant, as I think it is, we have to get serious about devising 
measures of physical and mental limitations which can be ap 
plied in sufficiently standardized fashion so as to move the 
discussion away from medical diagnosis to tests of function.
Our experience with disability programs should give us 
pause, but at least the right questions can be asked. If we 
have no compulsory ending point to the work experience and 
we substitute tests of performance, these may well be applied 
to workers long before they reach what used to be the ar 
bitrary age of retirement.
Is has always been an eligible defense against a charge of 
poor performance for a worker to note that, whatever his 
level of performance, it has not changed. If it has been con 
doned for years by the employer, arbitrators have been un 
willing to view low levels of performance as a cause for ter 
mination. That kind of argument is spreading as dismissal 
cases move into law courts in nonunion situations as the doc 
trine of "employment at will" seems to be deteriorating. In 
short, if one seeks to terminate an employee, it is necessary 
to show that something has changed. For this and other 
reasons, we need particularly sensitive measures of physical 
and mental functioning, if not general performance ap 
praisals.
Possibly this may be placing too great a burden on ar 
bitrary tests and on our systems of dispute settlement, be 
they arbitration or the courts. It might be that we could 
make use of the doctrine of presumptions. We could set an 
age of retirement, be it 65, 67 or 68, and if an employer seeks 
to retire someone prior to that age, we could require him to 
show that the workers is no longer able to meet the legitimate 
requirements of the job. Or that his physical or mental func 
tioning, if we deal with it at that level, has deteriorated to the 
point where he is not able to carry on. The presumption
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would be used in the opposite way for situations past that 
age where the employee would have to carry the burden of 
proof. In short, if the employer sought to retire a person past 
that age, the presumption would be that that would be O.K. 
but that the employee would now have the burden of show 
ing that he or she was competent to perform the re 
quirements of the job and that he or she has the requisite 
physical and mental capacities to perform the necessary 
tasks.
The use of presumptions might minimize litigation but one 
cannot be too sanguine about its possibilities. It is sad but 
true that, since the ancient days of Babylonia, we have found 
no satisfactory way to determine the disability status of an 
individual. There simply is no reason to believe that we could 
do much better if we seek to determine, in some legal sense, 
the "ability" status of an older person who the employer 
seeks to retire.
We should recognize that there are limits on what govern 
ments can accomplish in this field. It is one thing to say that 
compulsory retirement at a predetermined age is a bad 
policy; it is another to say that governments should attempt 
to forbid an employer from retiring a person at that age.
The arguments against governmental interference in this 
area go beyond the usual ones which relate the advantages of 
private decisionmaking. We simply lack the technical 
knowledge to derive administered tests of ability applicable 
to the wide range of occupations and industries in the U.S. 
Without such substitute tests, eliminating the chronological 
age test promises to usher in extensive litigation and to im 
pose other costs on private employers to the detriment of our 
competitive situations. If this is too extreme a position and if 
notions of discrimination on the basis of age, any age, are 
firmly entrenched, then laws prohibiting compulsory retire-
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ment are not enough. An integrated national policy requires 
us to move on several fronts: to reexamine our programs of 
education and training and our prevailing pay practices, to 
recognize the incentives and disincentives posed by the social 
insurance programs, and possibly simply to brace ourselves 
for yet another wave of litigation as arbitrators and courts 
consider essentially the same kinds of issues they have been 
struggling with in the disability area.
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